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Glossary 
Operational Problems: “Any occurrence or state the makes goal accomplishment 
impossible, difficult, or unsatisfying in light of standards for timely and effective 
performance. [1]” 
Workarounds: “Informal temporary practices for handling exceptions to normal 
workflow” [2], or “staff deviation actions that do not follow explicit or implicit 
rules, assumptions, workflow regulations, or intentions of system designers [3].”. 
Adaptations: “Any response to (perceived) problems in which a process or system is 
manipulated, in order to accomplish some pre-established goal relative to 
standards for timely and effective performance. [1]” 
Frames: The different “situated” perspectives by health care providers on clinical work, 
in terms of clinical environment, the patient and family, their training experiences, 
and “surprises” aggregated during the process of healthcare [4, 5]. 
System Frames: “A way of considering the system’s functionality and implementation as 
representative of the cumulative assumptions, decisions, priorities and perceived 
possibilities for problem-solving of the vendor, developers and implementation 
decision-makers. [4]”  
Practice Frames: “A similar aggregation of the bedside nurses’ perspective, as 
documented through observations and interviews. [4]” 
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Abstract 
Background: Medication administration errors (MAEs) have long been a prevalent 
problem and endanger patient safety. Bar-code medication administration (BCMA) systems were 
developed for the purpose of preventing the occurrence of MAEs. However, it has been 
demonstrated that the implementation of BCMA has brought about unanticipated consequences 
on nursing work and new, potential predictable paths to MAEs. More recently, investigators have 
introduced a new approach to describe the impact of BCMA on nursing work, which reflects 
nurses’ adaptations to the operational problems of BCMA under difficult circumstances. A more 
complete understanding of the process of nurses’ adaptations to technology will better inform 
intervention program for performance and safety improvement.  
Specific Aims: The specific aims of this study were to: 1) conduct an integrative 
literature review about operational problems of BCMA, 2) validate a typology of operational 
problems of BCMA yielded in the literature review, and 3) assess nurses’ adaptations to BCMA 
operational problems and describe their perceptions about the adaptations.  
Conceptual Framework: The conceptual framework guided this study was an 
integration of the work system from the Systems Engineering Initiative for Patient Safety (SEIPS) 
model and the frames perspective. When there is a collision between the frames (system frame 
and practice frame), the operational problems occur, and then nurses make adaptations to the 
operational problems. In this study, it is considered that the “system frame” is functionalized as 
the “work system”, which is the core of the SEIPS model.  
Methods: A prospective, exploratory design was conducted to meet the study aims. This 
descriptive study included two convenience samples of registered nurses working on identified 
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medical and surgical adult acute care units. An observation of BCMA use and a semi-structured 
interview was conducted with each participant of one group of sample (N=22) to collect data 
about the operational problems of BCMA. Another group of sample (N=21) conducted scenario 
interviews and follow-up interviews to describe their adaptations to the operational problems of 
BCMA.  
Results: This study found that 1) the triggers of operational problems of BCMA can be 
categorized according to the elements of the work system of the SEIPS model, which are 
technology and tools, tasks, person, environment, and organization; 2) the five elements of the 
SEIPS work system were validated for use as a typology of the triggers of operational problems 
of BCMA; 3) nurses conducted different adaptations with various strategies to accommodate to 
the operational problems of medication administration using BCMA; and 4) the perceptions of 
nurses about the adaptations to the operational problems of BCMA can be addressed by the 
sequential steps, implying nurses think in a logic and objective way during adaptations.  
Conclusions: This study provides a new way to approach the impact of BCMA on 
nursing work – adaptations. This is one of the first studies that attempts to understand nurses’ 
adaptations to the operational problems of BCMA, and also one of the first studies that 
investigates nurses’ perceptions about adaptations. Future research should more rigorously study 
nurses’ adaptive behaviors to operational problems. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Medication errors in hospitals have long been a prevalent problem [1-4] and 
endanger patient safety. Among the most common types of errors in hospital [1, 2, 5], 
medication errors are estimated to cause 1.5 million injuries and 7000 death per annum, 
and the treatment of medication errors related injuries cost the country $3.5 billion each 
year [6, 7]. There are 6.5 medication errors per 100 inpatient admissions, with 
approximately 34% occurring during medication administration [5, 8, 9]. The process of 
medication administration is complex; strategies have been developed for the purpose of 
preventing the occurrence of medication administration errors (MAEs). Bar-code 
medication administration (BCMA) systems were developed as an additional safeguard to 
prevent medication errors from reaching the patient’s bedside. BCMA systems typically 
work by pairing electronic medication administration records (eMAR), computerized 
provider order entry (CPOE) with bar-coded medications and bar-coded patient 
identification. In this way, BCMA systems provide support for the long-standing safe 
medication administration practice of verifying the five rights or “5Rs” of right patient, 
right dose, right route, right time, and right medication [10-12]. If, at the point of care, the 
system cannot match the digital 5Rs, it alerts the nurse with visual warnings. In addition, 
most organizations maintain an extensive set of procedural guidelines that provide nurses 
with guidance on actions that represent best practice responses to BCMA alerts.  
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 While a number of studies reported that BCMA systems do indeed reduce MAEs 
in hospitals [13-18], it has also been demonstrated that BCMA has led to unanticipated 
consequences on nursing work and new, potentially predictable paths to MAEs [16, 19-32]. 
A mounting number of studies specifically demonstrate that BCMA has a significant 
impact on nursing work when operational problems cause the nurse to alter task 
sequences, for example documenting the medication is delivered before it is actually 
given. Examples of operational problems include equipment issues such as large or bulky 
computer carts or scanners which cannot fit into the patient room, medications that are 
not available as expected, and incomplete, ambiguous, or erroneous information such as a 
warning regarding a discontinued medication because of CPOE and/or eMAR system 
issues [33, 34].  
Efforts to understand BCMA’s impact on nursing work have largely focused on 
nursing workarounds, which are generally considered as deviations from BCMA use 
protocols [22]. More recently, investigators have introduced the notion of “adaptation”. 
When operational problems happen, nurses have to respond to those problems in order to 
accomplish pre-established task goals; this process is defined as “adaptation” [21]. It 
reflects nurses’ attempts to create a fit when something does not fit [33]. A more complete 
understanding of the processes involved in nurses’ adaptations to the operational 
problems may better inform intervention programs for performance and safety 
improvement [35, 36].   
Little attention has been paid to factors that contribute to nurses’ decision-making 
around adaptations to BCMA-related operational problems, when the function of BCMA 
as designed does not fit the protocol of medication administration. This will be one of the 
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first studies that systematically summarizes operational problems of BCMA 
implementation in work systems, and comprehensively assesses nurses’ decision making 
to adapt to the operational problems in simulated environment.  The objectives of this 
study are to better understand nurses’ adaptations to the operational problems of BCMA 
and their perceptions about the adaptive behavior. The following specific aims were 
addressed in three studies as follows: 
Specific Aim 1/ Study 1: To conduct an integrative literature review about 
operational problems of BCMA.  
Specific Aim 2/ Study 2: To validate a typology of operational problems of 
BCMA yielded in the integrative literature review.   
Specific Aim 3/ Study 3: To assess nurses’ adaptations to BCMA operational 
problems and describe their perceptions about the adaptations. 
Background 
Medication Administration Errors (MAEs) 
MAEs threaten patient safety and quality of care in hospitals. Despite 
accreditation standards, public policies and availability of evidence for reducing MAEs 
during hospitalization, MAEs have been a national patient safety issue [2, 6, 8, 37, 38]. This 
may be, in part, because the process of medication administration is complex, and a 
number of opportunities exist for MAEs to occur [18]. Error prevention has traditionally 
been reliant on adherence to the procedure of the “5Rs” of medication verification (right 
drug, right time, right patient, right dose, and right route) and documentation, all of which 
may be negatively influenced by, for example, environmental distractions and failure to 
follow standard protocols [18]. 
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In the report To Err Is Human, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) suggested that 
most medication errors were the result of a system failure and recommended that the 
necessary path to improve quality and safety in healthcare should be focused on the 
improvement of care delivery systems [39]. Frameworks that emphasize human beings and 
their interactions with products, device, procedures, work space and the environment, are 
now accepted as a way to examine systems and suggests opportunities for improvements 
in quality and safety [40].  
In order to mitigate the risk to patient safety, the use of BCMA systems to verify a 
patient’s identity and the medication to be administered was introduced as a strategy for 
preventing MAEs.  
Bar Code Medication Administration (BCMA) Systems 
BCMA systems are comprised of an electronic administration records (eMAR), a 
computerized physician order entry (CPOE), hardware that contains a variety of bar code 
scanners, bar coded medications, bar coded patient identifiers, and portable computers 
[33]. An integrated process of medication administration with BCMA characteristically 
starts with medication orders originating from the CPOE system. Those orders are 
processed by the pharmacy, and then populate the eMAR. After the medications are 
distributed and retrieved from a dispensing system, nurses crosscheck the medications 
against the eMAR. Then, the nurse scans bar codes on the patient wristband and 
medication packaging, which allows the system to verify the “5Rs” between the patient 
identity and the medication. BCMA systems also generate an automatic documentation of 
the medication administration in the eMAR, including the time and the medication 
details. If there is a mismatch between what has been ordered and what is scanned, the 
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system will issue to the nurse a warning to a potential unsafe step in the medication 
administration process [28]. 
BCMA is being implemented in hospitals across the United States at an increasing 
pace with 27.5% of non-federal hospitals as of mid-2014 [41, 42]. In federal hospitals, the 
Veterans Administration (VA) has implemented BCMA in all 150 of its hospitals to 
assist preventing MAEs [43]. The final rule for Stage 2 Meaningful Use requires hospitals 
to “automatically track medications from order to administration using assistive 
technology in conjunction with an eMAR.” [44] 
Technology, Workarounds, and Adaptations  
 
In the computer technology field, it is well accepted that “no technology is 
exception-free and no simple technology is available to remove exceptions from 
workflow.” [36] It is known that the implementation of health IT introduces additional 
risks into the environment of care as a result of the unintended or unanticipated 
consequences of either design or implementation of the system [22, 45, 46]. Nurses, like 
other healthcare providers, are often expected to respond to the operational problems and 
alter their practices to accommodate the technology [47, 48]. When operational problems 
are considered as necessary consequences of the implementation of technology in a 
complex environment, nurses are necessarily engaged in operational problem solving, 
which is also known as “adaptations” [34, 48, 49].  
A problem, from human factor and ergonomics perspectives, is defined as “any 
occurrence or state the makes goal accomplishment impossible, difficult, or unsatisfying 
in light of standards for timely and effective performance [21].” Problems are often caused 
by a mismatch between the demands and the resources; therefore, problems represent 
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variability in the entire work system. Adaptations, or problem-solving, are “any response 
to (perceived) problems in which a process or system is manipulated, in order to 
accomplish some pre-established goal relative to standards for timely and effective 
performance [21].” The definitions of “adaptations” to “operational problems” clearly 
explicate that adaptations are goal-oriented behavior.   
Workarounds, a related concept, are defined as “informal temporary practices for 
handling exceptions to normal workflow” [50], or “staff deviation actions that do not 
follow explicit or implicit rules, assumptions, workflow regulations, or intentions of 
system designers” [51]. In contrast to “adaptations” which emphasize goal-oriented 
behaviors, the “workarounds” literature emphasizes behaviors as a consequence of the 
processes within a work system.    
Furthermore, “adaptation” emphasizes the process of operational problem solving 
as a dynamic process, in which the communication between nurses and the environment 
has the potential to inform pathways to design or redesign the work system.  
Workarounds are often studied under the assumption that workarounds are inherently 
dangerous and a threat to patient safety [22, 52-54]; whereas, adaptations are beneficial 
attempts, reflecting the reactions and decisions in difficult situations. It has been noted 
that some of today’s best practices were yesterday’s adaptations; some of today’s 
adaptations could also be tomorrow’s best practices [33].  
Studies Around the Technology, Workarounds, and Adaptations 
Nurses’ interaction with BCMA was studied from a human factors viewpoint by 
Carayon [20] in 2007. Eighteen different sequences of the BCMA process were identified; 
some of the steps identified were potentially unsafe. The most common workarounds in 
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steps sequences was documenting medication administration on the handheld device 
before the medication was given to and ingested by the patient. The elements in the work 
system, such as technology, organizational factors, physical environment, and 
individuals, were noted during observation and interviews as contributors to the problem. 
It is noteworthy that automation surprises, operationalized as unexpected, unpredictable 
responses by the technology [55], and interruptions, introduced from individuals, 
equipment and technology, and task itself, exclusively disorganized the pre-established 
steps of the medication administration process.  
Koppel [22] applied a triangulated effort with a combination of 5 methods in one 
study, which was designed to systematically evaluate workarounds when using BCMA 
systems. Researchers identified 15 types of workarounds in 3 categories (omitted steps, 
incorrect sequence, and unauthorized steps), and related them to 31 types of causes of 
workarounds and possible consequences. Many workarounds were found engendered by 
difficulties with the technology and by interactions between BCMA and other factors, 
such as environment, other technologies, work processes, workloads, training, and 
policies. Some of the causes were obvious difficulties in using BCMA, along with staff-
perceived limitations of BCMA and staff overestimation of BCMA’s risk-elimination 
abilities. A significant contributor of difficulties was not malfunctioning technology; 
rather, it was barriers produced by how the technology was designed and used in 
organizations, and how staff responded to the difficulties.  
Holden and Novak are the pioneers in the research area of studying nurses’ 
adaptive behaviors to the operational problems of BCMA from engineering prospective. 
They conducted a series of researches collectively to observe and interview nurses about 
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their problem-solving behavior following the implementation of BCMA [56-59]. They 
found that sometimes, BCMA allowed nurses to invent new problem-solving behavior to 
deal with pre-existing problems, and sometimes, BCMA made it difficult or impossible to 
apply some problem-solving behaviors that were commonly used pre-BCMA, but often 
requiring nurses to use potentially risky workarounds to achieve their goals. In some 
other cases, BCMA even created new problems that nurses were either able to solve 
using familiar or novel problem-solving behaviors, or unable to solve effectively. Besides 
the individual adaptations that nurses adopted to accommodate the needs of the 
technology to achieve work goals, at the organizational level, management decisions are 
implemented to either endorse the impact the technology imposes, or to soften or alter the 
impact of the technology on work through explicit or implicit policies that reject aspects 
of the impact.  
In summary, it is crucial to understand what operational difficulties a BCMA 
system might generate during medication administration process, how nurses will 
respond to those difficulties while interacting with other work system factors, as well as 
how nurses perceive the decisions they made in terms of causes, rationale, and impact of 
the behavior. This will be one of the first studies, which explores the nature of BCMA 
and adaptations by adapting the SEIPS model to the sociotechnical perspective. It is this 
study’s objective to fill the research gap of considering the interaction between nurses 
and the BCMA from a broader and more systematic perspective than the “workarounds”, 
and therefore to inform system redesign, intervention programs and educational 
campaigns for nurses’ behaviors, and institutional protocol and policy making in order to 
improve patient safety and work efficiency. 
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Approaches to Understanding BCMA’s Impact on Work 
A growing number of impact-on-work studies reveal how the implementation of 
BCMA changes the nature of nursing work. There is evidence of creation of potentially 
unsafe task sequences; for example, nurses may document that the medication is 
administered in advance of actually delivering it [17, 19, 22, 48]. It has also been found that 
BCMA can interrupt workflow when alerts are triggered[16, 19, 20, 22, 26-28, 60], create 
workload imbalance when nurses tend to prioritize medication administration and delay, 
or even miss, other necessary nursing care [16, 20, 22, 27, 61], and bring about other problems, 
such as inaccurate medication information [16, 20, 24, 27, 48].   
Although a number of studies have focused on the impact of BCMA on nursing 
work, most were conducted by observing the medication administration process and/ or 
interviewing nurses about the causes of observed behaviors as ways to collect data about 
workarounds. Few studies have addressed, however, the perceptions of nurses regarding 
the strategies they come up with. There has been a call for further research to better 
understand how an increase in emphasis on timely medication administration affects 
decision tradeoffs during goal conflicts [28]. No studies have explored the adaptations to 
operational problems of BCMA as a dynamic process. Factors that may contribute to this 
are unavailable methods in hospital for conducting a comprehensive assessment[33], 
complexity of studying the entwined processes of adaptations [22], BCMA’s evolving 
nature and evolving work rules [22], and nurses’ negative impression and resistance to the 
notion of workarounds. It is believed that when there are large gaps between intended 
practice, as recommended or mandated in policies and procedures, and actual practice, 
predictable problems emerges [62]. One alternative approach for minimizing the gap might 
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be to consider context of use during design, procurement, and implementation of system 
in order to make the technology useful, efficient, and usable for all settings of use [19].   
Thus, it is imperative to understand existing operational problems that are 
hindering efficient medication administration, how nurses respond to operational 
problems by interacting with other elements in work system, and nurses’ perception 
about the adaptations they made.   
Conceptual Framework Guiding this Research 
Work System Perspective  
Carayon and colleges [63] described the Systems Engineering Initiative for Patient 
Safety (SEIPS) model of work system and patient safety as a framework to understand 
the structures, processes and outcomes in healthcare and their relationships. The SEIPS 
model nests the work system model [64, 65] in Donabedian’s quality model [66, 67]. It clearly 
specifies the components of work system that can possibly contribute to the occurrence 
and control of medical errors, showing the nature of the interactions between the 
components, as well as displaying how the design of the work system can lead to 
acceptable and unacceptable processes [35, 64, 65] (see Figure 1.1).  
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Figure 1.1. SEIPS model of work system and patient safety. Source: Carayon, P., 
Schoofs Hundt, A., Karsh, B. T., Gurses, A. P., Alvarado, C. J., Smith, M., & Flatley 
Brennan, P. (2006). Work system design for patient safety: the SEIPS model. Qual Saf 
Health Care, 15 Suppl 1, i50-58. doi: 10.1136/qshc.2005.015842 
Frames Perspective 
Frames are the different “situated” perspectives by health care providers on 
clinical work, in terms of clinical environment, the patient and family, their training 
experiences, and “surprises” aggregated during the process of healthcare [48, 68]. From a 
sociotechnical perspective, operational problems happen when “the System Frame” 
collides with “the Practice Frame”. The “system frame” is “a way of considering the 
system’s functionality and implementation as representative of the cumulative 
assumptions, decisions, priorities and perceived possibilities for problem-solving of the 
vendor, developers and implementation decision-makers.”[48] The “practice frame” is “a 
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similar aggregation of the bedside nurses’ perspective, as documented through 
observations and interviews.”[48]  
Integration of Two Perspectives: Work System and Frames 
The conceptual framework for this study integrates the work system from the 
SEIPS model, and the frames perspective, the operational problems that occur when there 
is a collision between the frames, and the adaptations nurses make to the operational 
problems (see Figure 1.2). In this study, it is considered that the “System frame” is 
functionalized as the “work system”, which is core to the SEIPS model [35, 64, 65].  The 
components of the work system serve as the triggers to the operational problems of 
BCMA. These components as operationalized in this research include: (1) tasks, or the 
number and type of medications, sequence and duration of the medication administration 
process, registered nurses’ (RNs’) observation of patient taking medication, sanitization 
of hands, and occurrence of handoffs; (2) technology, the BCMA system, (3) 
organizational factors in which BCMA observations took place and specifically refer to 
the coordination, collaboration, and communication between nurse and physicians and 
pharmacists; (4) physical environment of the specific unit where observation took place, 
i.e., lighting, noise, neatness, organization, and crowdedness of the patient room and 
medication room; and (5) person including patient factors (e.g., isolation), comments of 
nurse and patient during medication administration relating to the medication 
administration process.  
The “Practice Frame” in this study includes the protocol or standards of the 
medication administration practice, including the use of the BCMA system and 
guidelines for addressing problems that arise when using the BCMA system.  Importantly, 
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the overriding practice goal of nurse medication administration is the 5Rs, regardless of 
whether the practice is enabled by the BCMA system.  That is, the practice frame reflects 
the practice goal of nurse.  
When one or multiple factors of the work system cannot meet the requirement of 
the medication practice frame, the work frame and the practice frame collide and create. 
That is operational problems. When operational problems occur, they trigger nurses to 
adapt their performance to accomplish the goal of medication administration conformant 
with the 5Rs. How nurses perceive and adapt to an operational problem involving BCMA 
systems is the focus of this research.   
 
Figure 1.2. BCMA and adaptation.  
In summary, the conceptual framework for this study includes a description of the 
work system as system frame, medication administration practice goals of assuring the 
5Rs as the practice frame, and the collision between the system frame and the practice 
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frame as a source of operational problem.  Nurses’ adaptations to operational problems of 
BCMA are the primary focus of this research.    
Overview of the Dissertation Chapters 
This dissertation used the three-study/paper format option. Chapter One has 
introduced the background of this study and the conceptual framework used to guide this 
study. Chapter Two is an integrative literature review of operational problems of BCMA 
(Dissertation Paper One). Chapter Three validates the operational problems of BCMA 
yielded in the integrative literature review (Dissertation Paper Two). Chapter Four 
assesses the process of nurses’ adaptations to BCMA operational problems and describes 
their perceptions about the adaptations (Dissertation Paper Three). Chapter Five 
summarizes the results of this dissertation and discusses the implications for future 
research and practice.  
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Chapter II 
Operational Problems of Barcode Medication Administration Systems:  
What Are They?  
An Integrative Literature Review 
Introduction 
Barcode medication administration (BCMA) systems were developed as an 
additional safeguard to prevent medication administration errors (MAEs) from reaching 
the patient’s bedside, by verifying a patient’s identity and the appropriate medications 
(name, dose, time, and route) to be administered [1-5]. A mounting number of studies 
indicate that BCMA systems have a significant impact on nursing work related to, for 
example, the introduction of inadequate supplies and equipment to support BCMA, and at 
times generating incomplete, ambiguous, or erroneous information [6, 7]. In order to meet 
the goal of safe and timely medication administration, nurses may have to change 
behaviors for using the BCMA system; this process is defined as “adaptation” [8]. 
Adaptations reflect nurses’ attempts to create a fit when something does not fit, 
which implies that, under difficult circumstances nurses come up with adaptations people 
can learn from and may become future best practice [6].  In fact, adaptations may be 
inevitable; necessary to accomplish work goals; can be learned from as new “best 
practice”; and consequently may need to be fostered and facilitated [9]. 
Researches on BCMA have emphasized workarounds, including a number of 
studies that have developed a typology of nurses’ workarounds and the causes and 
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possible consequences of each workaround when using BCMA [10-13].  “Workarounds” is 
a related concept, however workarounds are performed at individual level, typically 
include only once single step in the BCMA process, are generally interpreted as negative 
behaviors because not compliant with the practice protocol, and typically are observed as 
an action at single point in time to deliver the medication.  In contrast, adaptations can be 
performed at both individual level and institutional level, could comprise multiple steps 
in the process with multiple decisions to be made, are typically interpreted as neutral or 
positive behaviors even though not compliant with the practice protocol, and are 
considered as behaviors to make deliberate decisions to accommodate the work system.  
It is important to take one step back to understand why nurses have workarounds 
or adaptations? What is the nature of the operational problems of BCMA, and where are 
they coming from?  Operational problems of BCMA implementation remain 
understudied [14].  
To the best of this researcher’s knowledge, there is NOT a literature review 
regarding the operational problems of BCMA existing in the practice. The purpose of this 
article was to conduct an integrative literature review of BCMA implementation to 
identify the sources of the operational problems of BCMA.  
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework guiding this review is an integration of the SEIPS 
model and a sociotechnical perspective considering that operational problems occur 
because of the collision between the “System Frame” and the “Practice Frame”. The 
system frame is represented as the way the system is considered functionalized and 
implemented by the cumulative assumptions, decisions, priorities and perceived problem-
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solving of the vendor, developers and implementation decision-makers [14].  The work 
system within the SEIPS model frames dimensions of the system frame relevant to 
BCMA.  The practice frame that drives nurses medication administration practices 
includes safety, efficiency, and the “5Rs” (right patient, right medication, right time, right 
dose, and right route) of medication administration. 
 
Figure 2.1. BCMA and adaptation.  
When the components of the work system do not function well to meet the needs 
of the medication practice, nurses experience a collision between the work frame and 
practice frame and the result is operational problems; nurses then adapt their behavior to 
overcome the operational problems to meet the goal of the practice frame, i.e., 
medication administration in a timely and safe manner.  
This integrative literature review focuses on factors of the “System Frame” that 
trigger collisions with the practice frame, and thus create operational problems of BCMA. 
The purpose of this integrative literature review was to identify BCMA operational 
problems triggered by the work system.  In this way, the literature provides a foundation 
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for the two studies that follow, each with the goal of lending new insights into how 
collisions between the work or system frame and the practice frame influence nurse 
adaptations to operational problems encountered in BCMA.  
Methods 
A review of the peer-reviewed literature that evaluated the effect of the 
implementation of BCMA was conducted accessing MEDLINE, PreMEDLINE, 
International Pharmaceutical Abstracts, and Pub Med database. The studies of 
interest had to be published in English from 2000 to 2017.  The start date of the search is 
because the BCMA system and associated hardware was first developed and adopted to 
administer medication in the Veteran’s Health Administration (VA) since 2000 [15]. The 
keywords and terms used were barcode, bar code, barcoding, bar coding, barcode 
medication administration systems, medication systems, clinical pharmacy information 
systems, medication administration system, medication errors, hospital, nursing staff, 
evidence based nursing, nursing process. These keywords and terms were used 
independently and in various combinations to identify the studies synthesized for this 
literature review. A number of citations were found using the inclusion criteria (see Table 
2.1) and then systematically reduced by review of abstracts and article full-text to 
determine relevance to the purpose of this review (see Figure 2.2).  
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Table 2.1 
Article Literature Selection Criteria  
 
Attribute Selection Criteria 
Aim, time 
& language 
Studies that evaluate the effectiveness of the implementation of BCMA in 
hospitals, published in English from 2000 to current (October, 2017). 
Type of 
study 
Research Study.  
Participants  Nurses administering medications are all registered nurses. 
Setting  Patients are hospitalized in acute care hospitals. 
 
One hundred and thirty eight publications were identified. After reading the 
article citations and abstracts, 88 records were excluded. Within the remaining 50 full-
text articles, studies were excluded, if 1) the study was conducted in long-term care 
facility, 2) the research outcomes were MAE rate or the Adverse Drug Event (ADE) rate, 
the compliance rate or acceptance rate of the implementation of BCMA, the attitudes or 
satisfaction of nurses towards the implementation of BCMA, or change of the workflow 
or time distribution pattern after the implementation of BCMA, without describing the 
nature of the involved operational problems of BCMA, 3) only workarounds to BCMA 
were assessed without describing whether they were triggered by the occurrence of 
operational problems of BCMA, 4) those were editorial articles or single implementation 
case studies, or 5) the technology of the studies was not BCMA as a system, e.g., 
personal digital assistant (PDA), medication dispensing system, stand-alone BCMA 
without connecting to the EHR and COPE, etc. A final group of 12 research studies were 
retrieved and included in this review (see Figure 2.2).  
Each of the 12 included articles was reviewed in-depth. In the workarounds 
articles (n = 9) causes of workarounds were coded as work system triggers to the 
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operational problems. In the adaptation articles (n = 3), triggers to the operational 
problems were identified by the research. Triggers then were categorized by the 
researcher using the 5 elements of the SEIPS work system. Relevant text was copied and 
pasted from the manuscripts to a table in a Word® document for review and analysis.   
 
Figure 2.2. Prisma Diagram. 
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Results 
The results of the literature review of the operational problems of BCMA were 
sorted into the components of the SEIPS work system: technology and tools, tasks, 
organization, environment, and person.    
Technology and Tools Related Triggers of Operational Problems 
Technology and tools related triggers of operational problems primarily include 
problems with BCMA software and/or hardware [10, 16], although eMAR may cause 
difficulties, too. Carayon et al. [12] introduced a concept “automation surprises” when 
described operational problems regarding technology, which were considered as 
unexpected or unpredictable responses by the technology [17].  
The most frequently reported problem was multiple scan attempts needed until the 
barcode, attached on either patients’ wristband, nurse ID badge, or the medication 
packaging, was read [10, 12, 18-20], due to the technology capability [10]. 
Some studies reported that the screens sometime were difficult to read or navigate 
[10, 12]. Nurses may have to switch between multiple screens to locate medication 
information, medication orders, and completing medication administration in different 
systems. Sometimes, one or more screens might not be allowed to operate, if needed field 
grayed out, which could be very frustrating for nurses. Gooder [21] reported in a case-
control study that nurses had difficulties in determining what medication was due, or 
what medications the patient had already had.  
Other technology related triggers to operational problems were abruptly frozen 
handheld scanner or computer [12, 18, 22], failing to connect to the network [12, 22], dead 
batteries, loss of power or failing to be charged [10, 11, 18, 20], or delays in response [19], 
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which could lead to a hard stop during medication administration. BCMA system times 
out nurses, if they do not confirm medication administration within a preset period of 
time [10, 12]. Scanners emit similar beep sound every time nurses scan, no matter if it is the 
correct move or wrong, which could be confused or ignored if the system is sending an 
alert. Computer on wheels (COW) is too large to fit into patient room, or it is charged 
through the outlets in the hall, and cannot be moved to the patient’s bedside [10, 12]. If the 
scanner is too large, heavy, or bulky, nurses may be reluctant to carry it to patient’s room 
[10]. 
Tasks Related Triggers of Operational Problems 
Across the articles reviewed, issues related to scanning barcodes is the most 
frequently reported task-based trigger of operational problems [10-12, 18-26]. However, the 
understanding of the nature of the barcode issues is inconsistent across literature. 
Carayon [27] conducted an observational study, exploring the interaction between nurses 
and BCMA from a human factors viewpoint, in which administering medications that 
were not scanned or were not able to be scanned was considered as a task sequence that is 
not recommended. They also dug into the most common reasons for not scanning a 
barcode: 1) the barcode had not been inputted in the dataset due to nonformulary 
medication; 2) there was no barcode on medication; 3) the barcode on the package, 
especially for insulin and eye drops, was not able to be scanned by the nurses. 
Barcode issues trigger operational problems in different ways. Barcode may exist 
inside different package, or one medication packaging had multiple barcodes, in which 
case nurses were not familiar with the variation from common situation [10].  If the 
medication is brought from a patients’ home, or if the dispensing machine was out of 
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order, the medications may do not have a barcode [10, 22]. Some medications, e.g., insulin, 
eye drops, and ointment in particular, may have barcodes, which are difficulty to scan, 
and the labels may be damaged or compromised [12, 19, 20]. Wristband barcodes may not 
scan as reliably as medication barcode [11]. Sometimes, barcodes themselves could be 
wrong, which requires nurses must to do a visual check of the medication [24].  
Novak and her colleagues conducted extensive research on BCMA operational 
problems and how nurses interact with those problems from a system perspective [23-25]. 
They observed the BCMA system’s tenacity with respect to “right time”. In a variety of 
situations, nurses would delay administering a scheduled medication for a number of 
reasons: 1) the previous dose of the medication had been administered later than 
scheduled due to a surgical procedure; 2) an incompatible medication was presently being 
administered; 3) the administration of many medications required prior blood pressure 
readings, blood glucose measurements or research as to contraindication, side effects or 
adverse reaction; and 4) patient was in rest or tripped off the unit for tests and procedures, 
and meals. In some other situations, medications, particularly PRN (as needed) 
medications, may needed to be administered ahead of schedule, but the standard interval 
assigned to the timing of it had not elapsed. In the era of paper MAR, when nurses found 
they needed to administer a medication outside the window of “on-time” administration, 
no matter early or delayed, or they thought this could affect the timing of downstream 
doses, they could documented a plan in the MAR to “stagger” the patient back onto the 
original schedule through a series of appropriately adjusted doses in terms of timing. But 
within the BCMA system, it does not allow this flexibility from nurses’ perspective, 
rather than being documented as “late” or issued a warning against administration, which 
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may cause stigma of late doses. Nurses have the authority and ability to adapt the 
schedule as was clinically appropriate and within their scope of practice [14]. 
Another representation of “tenacity” of the system is that nurses were not 
autonomous regarding adjusting doses of medications [25]. Holden, Alper [28] believed 
BCMA system applied an exclusive interpretation of physicians’ original order, despite 
nurses’ capability of making a simple substitution between two clinically equivalent sets 
of doses, e.g. one 20 mg vs. two 10 mg. Koppel, Wetterneck [10] also reported that when 
less than a full dose was available at the time nurses administered medications, or 
syringe/medication tablet contained more than ordered dose, nurses were not allowed to 
change the prescribed order, but altered the automatic documented administration that 
was based on the dose on the scanned barcode. For example, pharmacy sent 10-mg tablet 
instead of a 20-mg, nurses either documented a partial dose being administered and asked 
the physician to create an order to administer the remainder when it arrived, or scanned 
the medication twice to document a complete medication administration, delivered the 
partial dose, and remembered to administer the remainder later.  
Additionally, in urgent cases, in which medication needed to be administered 
before ordered and documented, nurses used a blank MAR to document medications 
administered, bypassing the BCMA. However, in order to charge administered 
medications on the blank MAR, they had to be entered into the CPOE, which generated a 
new order being transmitted to the BCMA. Pharmacists then had to discontinue the order 
immediately after entering it [25].     
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Individual Related Triggers of Operational Problems 
In the model of this review, individuals involved in the medication administration 
process include patients, families, nurses, and other disciplines. If patients removed 
wristband by themselves, or the wristband did not fit the patients’ limb because of, for 
example, a cast or bandaging, then patients may would not be wearing a wristband [20]. 
Nurses then would not have the barcode on the patients to scan for the purpose of 
verifying the “right” patient. Patients under special circumstances could compromise the 
process of medication administration, for example, patients refused medications or 
vomited medications, or patients were sleeping, agitated, receiving central lines, 
showering, breastfeeding, or in contact isolation [10, 12, 18, 20].  
Nurses with inadequate BCMA training, may be not familiar with which of 
several barcodes on medications to scan, which screens had needed information, 
confirmation procedures, or how to respond to allergy notification [10, 19].  
Environment Related Triggers of Operational Problems 
Environment related triggers of operational problems were described 
straightforward in the literature and referred to the hospital’s physical structure and 
locations of persons, medications, and related technologies [10]. Some studies reported 
that nurses perceived the general physical environment as messy and disorganized for 
both the patient room and the medication room [12]. Noise may be loud in the medication 
room, and the alarm sound from the BCMA system may not be noticeable [10, 12]. Some 
doorways and patient room configurations hinder bedside access of the COWs. 
Medications may be stored remotely from the scanner, which necessitates multiple trips 
to scan, dispense, and return the remaining dose [10].  
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Organization Related Triggers of Operational Problems 
Organizational operational problems that trigger operational problems include the 
interruptions initiated by patients and families, providers, medications, or technologies. 
This category of problems also refers to the coordination, collaboration and 
communication between nurses and physicians, pharmacists, and nurse assistants. 
An interruption has been defined as the occurrence of an event recognized by the 
nurses that disturbed the normal processing of the current task performed [29-31]. Carayon, 
Wetterneck [12] found during medication administration, patients and/or families may ask 
questions, request water or juice to go with the medication, be sleeping or in bathroom, 
get intravenous catheter infiltrated, or be changing dressing. Another party who often 
interrupted during medication administration was physicians, for instance, physicians 
examined and talked to the patient or the nurse at patient bedside, in the process of 
medication administration. Medication administrating process would also have to be 
interrupted when medication was missing, medication-related information was missing, 
new patient ID wristband was needed, components of tools of administering (e.g. needle 
or extension tubing) was required, or previous intravenous bag was still running. A range 
of equipment and technologies in hospital equip advanced medical services, as well as 
bring about interruptions, such as intravenous pump sounding alarm, programming of 
pump, and wrapping handheld device in plastic when entering patient’s room in contact 
isolation.  
Nurses collaborate with multiple disciplines in hospital, especially when patients 
are transferred between different departments. Therefore, maintaining the continuity of 
the medication administration routine remains challenging but critical, and necessitates 
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coordination, collaboration and communication between nurses and other relevant 
personnel. Novak [23] conducted a qualitative research study to understand the new 
cognitive and physical tasks that were required of nurses when BCMA was implemented 
using organizational routines theory. When a patient came from the Emergency 
Department (ED), he/she often had medications ordered, but not confirmed or 
administered in the eMAR since the ED was not using the BCMA system. It was reported 
frustrating and time consuming for nurses to address and confirm numerous unconfirmed 
medications that were given prior to arriving on unit. In order to administer a medication, 
the patient must be admitted to the unit with an active medical record account. However, 
sometimes, the unit secretary would discharge a patient before he/she was going out the 
door, when the patient still had medications to be taking, and the nurse was not able to 
administer any medication to a person who was technically not a patient any more. When 
patients were on pain medications, physicians would prescribe a “range order”, so that 
physicians determined the doses according to a range of pain levels assessed by the 
nurses. But the dose in the pharmacy dispensing system remained the upper limit of the 
“range”, therefore when nurses administered the dose lower than that, an incorrect 
amount warning displayed.     
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Table 2.2 
Summary of Included Studies 
 
Authors Aim Method Participants Setting Operational Problem 
Carayon, 
Wetterneck 
[12] 
Explore nurses’ use of 
BCMA technology 
from a human factors 
viewpoint.  
Structured 
observation. 
62 observations A 472-bed 
Midwestern 
academic medical 
center, USA 
Not scannable barcode, 
automation surprises, 
alarms, interruptions, 
unfavorable 
environment, and 
patient under special 
conditions.  
Gooder [21] Examine the perceived 
impact of BCMA 
system on nurses’ 
ability to give 
medications, 
perceptions of 
medication errors, and 
nurses’ satisfaction 
with the medication 
administration process.  
Case-control study 
using questionnaire 
in one unit that was 
implementing the 
BCMA system and 
one unit that was 
not, before and 5 
months after the 
implementation.  
Prior to the 
implementation, 25 
surveys on the 
experimental unit and 
22 surveys on the 
control unit. After the 
implementation, 33 
staff on the BCMA unit 
and 26 staff on the 
control unit.  
A 28-bed medical 
unit and a 28-bed 
cardio-vascular 
step-down unit in a 
280-bed acute care 
facility in the 
western USA.  
System is hard to 
navigate and not user-
friendly. 
Huang and 
Lee [22] 
Explore the impact on 
nursing activity 
patterns of using 
BCMA and understand 
the nurses’ usage of 
BCMA.  
Work sampling 
observation and 
interviews.  
40 from the BCMA 
group and 46 from the 
paper group, 4940 
observations.  
A medical center 
in northern Taiwan 
Network disconnection 
and breakdown, user 
inconvenience, and 
unavailable drug 
dispensing machine.   
Koppel, 
Wetterneck 
[10] 
Develop a typology of 
clinicians’ 
workarounds when 
using BCMA systems; 
identify the causes and 
Mixed method 
which combined 5 
methods into a 
triangulated 
research effort: 
62 structured 
observations, 31 
shadowing of nurses, 
29 nurse interviews  
A 470-bed 
Midwestern 
academic tertiary-
care hospital and a 
four-hospital, 929-
Technology: timeout, 
multiple screens and 
scans, unavailable 
information, bulky 
computer cart or 
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possible consequences 
of each workaround. 
observation of 
BCMA use and 
shadowing, 
interviews with 
staff and hospital 
leaders, 
participation in 
staff meetings, 
failure modes and 
effects analysis 
(FMEA), and 
analysis of BCMA 
override log data.  
bed East Coast 
health care system, 
USA 
scanner, connectivity, 
dead batteries, scanning 
failure; Tasks: not 
typical barcode, 
packaging discarded; 
Organizational: partial 
or too large dose, or 
different formulation, 
nonformulary 
medication, unavailable 
order, unavailable 
barcode, inadequate or 
incapable staff; Patient: 
unavailable barcode, 
interfered activities; 
Environment: remote 
scanner, loudness, 
unfavorable setting.  
Novak [23] Describe hidden work 
resulting from the 
implementation of 
BCMA. 
Ethnographic study 
using triangulation 
of field notes from 
non-participant 
observation, 
meeting 
documentations and 
email 
communications.  
Over 120 hours of 
observation and 170 
emails. 
Ten adult inpatient 
units in an 
academic medical 
center, USA  
Orders were not 
confirmed when 
patients were 
transferred between 
different departments 
who use different 
systems; “range order”; 
changed schedules. 
Novak, 
Anders [24] 
Examine the work of a 
group of nurses who 
serve as mediators of 
the adoption and use 
of a BCMA system 
Ethnographic 
methods, using 
field notes from 
observation, 
documents, and 
Over 50 hours of 
observation, 170 email 
communications.  
A multi-hospital, 
tertiary medical 
center, USA 
No “staggering doses” 
feature, missed doses, 
and instructions 
specific to a particular 
dose of medication; 
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using mediation 
framework.  
email 
communications to 
enable a 
triangulation 
research method. 
inappropriatedly 
documented doses 
stretching out across 
shifts.    
Novak, 
Holden [25] 
Describe how the 
nurses’ orientation can 
collide with the 
orientation that is 
represented by the 
technology and its 
implementation, 
resulting in 
adaptations at the 
individual and 
organizational levels.  
Qualitative study 
using observation 
and ethnographic 
fieldwork, content 
analysis of email 
communications, 
and interviews with 
healthcare 
professionals.  
313 episodes of 
problem solving, over 
50 hours of 
observation, and 170 
email communications. 
One 236-bed, 
academic, tertiary 
care, freestanding 
pediatric hospital 
in the Midwest and 
one multi-hospital, 
tertiary medical 
center, USA. 
Hidden directions of 
medication 
administration; have to 
delay the 
administration; system 
“tenacity” for PRN 
medications; not 
autonomous to 
physicians’ orders.  
Patterson, 
Cook [11] 
Identify side effects 
from a natural 
experiment, the 
implementation of 
BCMA, a technology 
designed to reduce 
ADEs. 
Cross-sectional 
observational study 
of medication 
passes before and 
after BCMA 
implementation 
using detailed, 
handwritten field 
notes.   
67 nurse-BCMA 
interactions/ mini-cases 
Acute care and 
nursing home 
wards of 3 VA 
hospitals, USA 
Degraded coordination 
between nurses and 
physicians; 
unscannable barcode; 
interruption and 
distraction; system 
shutdown; no “taper 
dose” feature. 
Rack, 
Dudjak [20] 
Analyze frequency and 
potential causes of 
workarounds in 
hospital using BCMA 
technology.  
Mixed method of 
nurse focus group 
and staff nurse 
survey, which 
collected data 
related to the types 
and frequency of 
220 respondents and 42 
staff nurses in the focus 
group 
An academic 
medical center, 
USA 
 
 
 
 
Scanning failure; 
dysfunctional scanner 
and computer; patient 
under special situation; 
structure and location 
don’t allow scanning.  
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workarounds.  
van 
Onzenoort, 
van de Plas 
[19] 
Study factors 
influencing the bar-
code verification by 
nurses during 
medication 
administration.  
Descriptive study 
by calculating the 
frequency of bar-
code verification 
against the 
administering time, 
departments, 
availability of bar-
code, number of 
drugs to be 
administered, and 
staffing 
23,492 medication 
administrations 
Five medical 
departments at the 
University 
Hospital 
Maastricht 
(UHM), 
Netherlands 
Difficulties in scanning 
barcodes on the 
medication labels; lack 
of awareness of 
barcodes on medication 
labels; delays in 
responses from the 
EHR.  
Voshall, 
Piscotty [26] 
Present an overview of 
the literature regarding 
BCMA systems and 
best practices and 
suggest actions for 
nurse leaders to 
decrease workarounds 
in the process. 
Literature review of 
empirical studies 
published between 
2000-2010 using 
keywords barcode 
and workarounds. 
14 empirical studies  Not applicable Unfavorable design of 
hardware; unavailable 
barcode; interruptions.  
Zadvinskis, 
Chipps [18] 
Explore nurses’ 
perceptions regarding 
EHRs and BCMA 4 
months post 
implementation.  
Qualitative study 
using 
phenomenological 
approach with 
semi-structured 
interviews. 
10 staff nurses One medical-
surgical unit in an 
academic medical 
center, USA 
Software issues, power 
loss, difficult logging 
on and scanning; 
missing medication; 
time restriction; 
interruption. 
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Conclusion 
This integrative literature review focused on triggers to the operational problems 
of BCMA according to the work system perspective of the SEIPS model. To summarize, 
the triggers to operational problems of BCMA can be categorized according to the 5 
elements of the work system of the SEIPS model, including tasks related, technology 
related, organization related, environment related, and individual related triggers to 
operational problems. The review suggests that the 5 elements of the work system of the 
SEIPS model may serve as a typology for categorizing triggers.  
Clearly triggers to operational problems can be considered in different ways, 
depending on the perspective one takes. For example, a missing medication is a tasks 
related trigger to operational problem when number and type of medications are the 
major focus of tasks in medication administration.  Others may classify a missing 
medication as an organizational problem when nurses go searching for the missing 
medication during medication administration.  
Even with the most advanced system, the introduction of a new technology into a 
complex environment can bring unanticipated side effects on technical, social, 
organizational, economic, cultural, and political respects of work [32, 33]. Even the best-
designed system will fail in an environment in which dysfunctional practices undermine 
the proper use of the system [34]. Therefore, an understanding of operational problems of 
BCMA implementation will help us better recognize how nurses adapt to the operational 
problems, and therefore optimize the effectiveness of the adoption of the BCMA system.  
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By examining the triggers to operational problems of BCMA from the perspective 
of work system components, this lays the foundation for the next two studies to 
understand nurse adaptations.  
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Chapter III 
Operational Problems of Barcode Medication Administration Systems:  
A Qualitative Study 
Introduction 
Bar-code medication administration (BCMA) systems were developed to prevent 
medication errors, in part, by verifying a patient’s identity and the appropriate medication 
to be administered at the right time [1-3]. Although a number of studies reported that 
BCMA systems reduce MAEs in hospitals [4-9].  What has also been demonstrated is that 
BCMA has led to unanticipated consequences on nursing work and new, potentially 
predictable paths to MAEs [10-24].  
Efforts to understand BCMA’s impact on nursing work have largely focused on 
nursing “workarounds”, which are generally considered as deviations from BCMA use 
protocols [13]. “Adaptation”, on the other hand, reflects nurses’ attempts to create a new 
route to achieving a goal such as safe and timely medication administration.   
The operational problems nurses encounter that trigger adaptations is under-
studied; there are no studies that have systematically explored the operational problems 
of BCMA in practice. Recently, there have been calls to conduct further research to 
identify the characteristics of the BCMA system nurses consider problematic and in need 
of modification, so that the system design can reflect on nurses’ considerations with 
respect to system usability, functionality, and impact on nursing practice [25].  
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Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework guiding this study is an integration of the SEIPS 
model and a sociotechnical perspective considering that operational problems occur 
because of the collision between the “System Frame” and the “Practice Frame”. The 
system frame is represented as the way the system is considered functionalized and 
implemented by the cumulative assumptions, decisions, priorities and perceived problem-
solving of the vendor, developers and implementation decision-makers [26].  The work 
system within the SEIPS model frames dimensions of the system frame relevant to 
BCMA.  The practice frame that drives nurses medication administration practices 
includes safety, efficiency, and the “5Rs” (right patient, right medication, right time, right 
dose, and right route) of medication administration. The focus of this study is validation 
of the typology of work system triggers of operational problems of BCMA (see Figure 
3.1).  
 
Figure 3.1. BCMA and adaptation.  
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Literature Review 
The literature reported in Chapter II focused on components of the work system 
(see system frame) and is summarized as follows.  The most frequently reported 
technology and tool related triggers of operational problem of BCMA was the repetitive 
scan attempts until the system could pick up the barcode [13, 17, 27-29], due to the technology 
capability [13]. The EHR system sometimes was hard to navigate [13, 27, 30], especially when 
nurses had to switch several screens between different systems, for example in some 
hospitals, the CPOE was isolated from the eMAR, or different services had their unique 
access to the system. Other technology difficulties could be contributed by the a abruptly 
frozen system [27, 28, 31], dead power supply or Internet connection [27, 31-35], time out by the 
system [13, 29], or an oversize or overweight computer or scanner [13, 27].  
Tasks related triggers of operational problems were primarily addressed by the 
barcode issues. Barcodes could be wrong, [36], multiple available [13], not available [13, 31], 
or hard to scan [17, 27, 29]. Novak and her colleges described the system as “tenacious”, as 
nurses were not autonomous to strategically adjust the doses of medications and the time 
of the administration for any reason [36-38]. Therefore, nurses were not able to stagger the 
schedule of medication administration as was clinically appropriate and within their 
scope of practice [15], or substitute with clinically equivalent sets of doses, when partial or 
extra doses were ordered [39].  
Person related triggers involved in the medication administration could bring 
about operational problems. Patients in special situations impeded the performance of 
medication administration, i.e., patients refused or vomited medications, or patients were 
resting, agitated, in the restroom, or in contact isolation [13, 27-29]. Sometimes, patient 
  50 
removed their wristband with or without any reason, and then nurses had to obtain 
another wristband barcode to scan [29].  
Several environmental factors could interfere the procedure of medication 
delivery. Nurses could not access to the bedside or the computer, if the configuration of 
the patient’s room is not user-friendly designed. Messy or disorganized patient room or 
medication room hindered efficient medication administration, especially when multiple 
trips to scan, dispense, and return of the remaining were needed [27, 32]. 
Organizational triggers of operational problems were addressed as interruptions 
and coordination, collaboration and communication between nurses and physicians and 
pharmacists. Interruptions happened when patients and families initiated special requests, 
physicians intervened in the process, medication or barcode was found missing during the 
process, or other medical equipment sounded alarms [27]. Interdisciplinary collaboration, 
coordination, and communication filled up the gap, to some extent, when patients were 
transferred with pending or active medication orders between different departments, 
where the BCMA was not applied [37].  
The purpose of the study was to validate the findings of the work system triggers 
to operational problems of BCMA identified in the literature review in Chapter II. Given 
the fact that this study touched the sensitive issues of medication administration errors 
and workarounds, there was not a single approach that was able to uncover the truth.      
Methods 
The aims of the study were to explore what operational problems of BCMA 
nurses were having in their daily practice or expecting to happen in the future, and then 
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validate the findings in literature review reported in Chapter II. Approval of the 
Institutional Review Board from the study site was obtained.   
Study Design  
A prospective, exploratory design was conducted to meet the study aims.   
Sample  
Given that the compliance rate of BCMA across the hospital reached around 90% 
and considering operational problems of BCMA was a rare incidence, it was planned to 
enroll 30 nurses for observation and interviews about BCMA-related operational 
problems, until data saturation was reached. Multiple studies have identified a sample 
size of 30 nurses as a sample size required to reach saturation [27, 30, 32-34, 36, 38, 40-42].  
Inclusion criteria were: 1) permanent full-time staff RNs; 2) working on one of 
four medical and surgical adult acute care units; 3) having worked on the unit for at least 
one year (including unit based temporary staff); 4) having been trained to use BCMA; 
and 5) having experience in using BCMA. Exclusion criteria were central staffing 
resource nurses (CSR temporary staff). 
Setting 
This study was conducted in a 1000 bed large academic medical center located in 
Michigan. Nurses were recruited from 4 adult medical-surgical units. The BCMA system 
used in the study site is a part of the EHR system, which provides with technology 
support for an integrative electronic medical records system used across different units, 
departments, and hospital sites within the health system. 
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Procedures 
Data collection consisted of: (1) observations of BCMA use by shadowing of staff 
administering medication, (2) interviews with staff nurses involved in BCMA use.  
Observations and interviews respectively provided examples of BCMA-related 
operational problems. The integration of these data sources supplement each other to 
provide a more comprehensive perspective.   
A semi-structured interview guide was developed with open-ended questions and 
probes (see Appendix I). The interview guide was modified after consulting with the 
hospital specialist who monitors and audits the BCMA scanning compliance condition 
within the entire system, and also conducts education and training with nurse staff about 
the BCMA usage.  
1. Development of the observation form  
The observation form developed for the on-site observation addressed the steps of 
the workflow of medication administration practice on the study site (see Figure 3.2). 
This form was reviewed by a nurse specialist of the study site, who persistently oversees 
and audits the compliance report of BCMA scanning across the entire medical system 
every month. Necessary modification to the observation form was made accordingly. 
Field notes were made when an operational problems was triggered at any key step.  
2. Development of the interview guide 
Nurses were asked to give examples of conditions that triggered operational 
problems with open-ended questions, framing their examples by the components of the 
work system of the SEIPS model: technology, tasks, environment, organization, and 
person. Besides the current operational problems the nurses had already encountered, 
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future difficulties that the nurses could think of were also addressed in the interview (see 
Appendix I).  
 
Figure 3.2. Observation form.  
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3. On-site observation 
After obtaining IRB and Nursing Administration Research Committee approvals 
at the study sites, a list of eligible unit sites (medical and surgical adult acute care units) 
was obtained. Three pilot observations (n=3, 10% of the targeted sample size) were 
conducted on one study unit to test the observation form.  
Next, a list of potentially eligible nurses from the Nurse Manager or designee (e.g. 
charge nurse) was obtained, upon arrival at the eligible unit sites. Nurses were randomly 
selected from this list and validated with the Nurse Manager or designee about their 
eligibility against the inclusion criteria. Eligible nurses were approached to participate in 
the study by enrolled after obtaining a written informed consent. All the recruited nurses 
consented and participated in the observations and the follow-up interviews. The 
consented nurses then agreed on a time during that day when the nurse agreed to be 
observed and interviewed. The observation of each event was planned for 10 minutes.  
Each nurse was observed for 1-3 medication administration events. One 
medication administration event was an event of one patient being given a set of doses of 
medications at a time. The observation of each medication administration event started 
when the nurse accessed the eMAR in the medication room. When the nurse obtained the 
medications from either patient’s cabinet or the Omnicell, the amount and type of the 
medications that needed to be delivered, and their availability when the nurse accessed 
them were observed. Then, the nurse went into the patient’s room and, if the medications 
were available, prepared medications at the patient’s bedside. Data collected by the 
researcher: 1) patient’s level of consciousness, 2) surface used for medication 
administration, 3) lighting sufficiency in patient room, 4) other environmental factors 
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(e.g., noisy, crowded, organized, etc.), and 5) barcode availability. The nurse would scan 
the patient’s wristband, where the availability of the wristband and the verification of 
patient’s identity were conducted by the nurse, followed by another scanning on the 
medications barcodes. Finally, the medications would be administered, and the 
administration would be automatically documented in the eMAR. In the course of the 
medication administration, other information which would be taken notes as well were: 
all the warnings triggered by the system, personnel involved in the process, and whether 
the scanner reached out without hitting objects.  
4. Follow-up interviews 
After the observation, a semi-structured interview with each nurse was conducted 
in a private room. The interview focused on the operational problems the nurses had 
encountered and expected could happen in the future. The interview was planned for no 
longer than 30 minutes. The interview was tape-recorded. Basic demographic information 
was also collected, including age, gender, and education.  
Data Analysis 
Quantitative and qualitative data were analyzed separately and collectively. 
Quantitative observation data were analyzed using descriptive statistics (minimum, 
maximum, mean and standard deviation; frequency and percent). The field notes on 
triggers of operational problems were coded into work system elements of SEIPS model: 
(1) tasks are number and type of medications, including pharmacy-prepared medications, 
which are known as ready-to-administered medications, and medications that have to be 
labeled on unit. Necessary care related to medication administration is also counted as a 
part of the task, such as glucose monitoring and blood pressure monitoring; (2) 
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technology primarily refers to BCMA although eMARs were included because they may 
introduce technology-based difficulties; (3) organizational factors could be coordination, 
collaboration and communication between nurse and physicians, pharmacists, or nurse 
assistants; (4) environment is described as lighting, noise, neatness, organization, 
crowdedness of the patient room and medication room, and interruptions introduced from 
environment and other individuals; and (5) person includes patient factors (e.g., isolation, 
rest, critical conditions) and disciplines. Both quantitative observation data and 
qualitative interview data were coded and classified into operational problems.  
Interviews were fully transcribed. The responses to each question were 
summarized.  
Results 
Sample Characteristics 
When data saturation was reached, twenty-two nurses were enrolled in the 
observation, with all of them completing the follow-up interviews (n = 22). Table 3.1 
demonstrates that the majority of nurses were younger than 25 years old (n = 6, 27.3%), 
female (n = 20, 90.9%), working in unit A (n = 9, 40.9%), and professionally trained with 
a baccalaureate degree (n = 18, 81.8%).  
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Table 3.1 
Characteristics of Sample (N=22) 
Variables N (%) Variables N (%) 
Age  Unit  
<25 6 (27.3) A 9 (40.9) 
25-30 5 (22.7) B 6 (27.3) 
30-35 3 (13.6) C 2 (9.10) 
35-40 3 (13.6) D 5 (22.7) 
40-50 5 (22.7) Education  
Gender  Associate Degree 2 (9.10) 
Male 2 (9.10) Baccalaureate Degree 18 (81.8) 
Female 20 (90.9) Master’s Degree 2 (9.10) 
 
Observation Data  
There were 43 medication administration events observed and included in the 
study. One medication administration event was defined as one nurse passing 
medications with one patient at one point in time. The average duration of each 
medication administration event was 13.19 minutes, with a standard deviation of 9.34, 
and an average of 5.16 medications were delivered during that time (SD = 3.96). Most of 
the observations were conducted in the morning between 7 am to 9 am (n = 26, 60.5%). 
Table 3.2 summarizes the full results of the observations. 
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Table 3.2 
Descriptive Data on Major Observation Variables (N = 43) 
Variables N (%) Mean ± SD 
Duration of Medication Administration (min)  13.19 ± 9.34 
Number of Medications Passed  5.16 ± 3.96 
Time of Observation   
7 am – 9 am 26 (60.5)  
2 pm – 3 pm 10 (23.3)  
9 pm – 11 pm 7 (16.3)  
Medication Availability    
Yes 37 (86.0)  
No 6 (14.0)  
Patient Level of Consciousness    
Alert 31 (72.1)  
Vigilant 7 (16.3)  
Lethargic 4 (9.30)  
Stupor 1 (2.30)  
Surface Used for Medication Administration   
Computer on Wheel (COW) 28 (65.1)  
Patient Table 7 (16.3)  
Wall Tray 1 (2.30)  
More Than One Platforms 7 (16.3)  
Lighting In Patient Room   
Overhead Lighting 27 (62.8)  
Supplemental Lighting 3 (7.00)  
Daylight  6 (14.0)  
Screen light  7 (16.3)  
Environmental Factors    
Noisy 1 (2.30)  
Crowded 17 (39.5)  
Organized  24 (55.8)  
Both Noisy and Crowded  1 (2.30)  
 
Medication Barcode Scanning Availability  
  
Yes 43 (100)  
No 0 (0.00)  
Scanner Reaches   
Without Hitting Objects 31 (72.1)  
Stretching Over Patient  11 (25.6)  
Other 1 (2.30)  
Wristband Barcode Scanning Availability    
Yes 36 (83.7)  
No 7 (16.3)  
Five Rights Accountability    
Yes 22 (51.2)  
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No 21 (48.8)  
Dual Sign Off Application    
Yes 0 (0.00)  
No 43 (100)  
Patient Readiness    
Yes 30 (69.8)  
No  13 (30.2)  
System Warning    
Medication Not Scanned Warning  1 (2.30)  
Administration Warning  5 (11.6)  
Both  2 (4.70)  
No Warning 35 (81.4)  
Personnel Involved Other than Nurses and Patients   
Physicians  6 (14.0)  
NP/PA  1 (2.30)  
Families 5 (11.6)  
Pharmacists  15 (34.9)  
More Than One Personnel  7 (16.3)  
No Other Personnel  9 (20.9)  
 
In the majority of the medication administration events, medications were 
available when they were due (n = 37, 86%). Most of patients involved were alert (n = 31, 
72.1) or vigilant (n = 7, 16.3%). The computer keyboard attached beneath the monitor of 
the computer on the wheels (COWs) was the most frequent surface used by the nurses to 
place the medication (n = 28, 65.1%), followed by the patient bedside table (n = 7, 
16.3%). In 7 events, nurses laid out the medications on the keyboard to scan the barcodes 
and then placed them on the table before they scanned patients’ wristbands (16.3%). 
Nurses preferred to use the overhead lighting for medication administration (n = 27, 
62.8%), whereas in some nighttime events, nurses passed the medications only under the 
faint light of the screen of the computer (n = 7, 16.3%). Some of the patients’ rooms were 
crowded (n = 17, 39.5%) when the nurses passed the medications, and the nurses hit 
objects (n = 31, 72.1%) or stretched over the patients (n = 11, 25.6%) when extending the 
cord of the scanner to reach the patients. Medication barcode was available in all 
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observed events. There were a few observations when patients’ wristbands were not 
available (n = 7, 16.3%), either because they were not attached on patients’ wrists or the 
barcodes wore out. In many observations, patients were not ready for medication 
administration when the nurses approached them with medications (n = 13, 30.2%); for 
example, they were still eating meal, or getting ready for a trip off the floor.  
Among the 8 cases when the nurses recorded a system warning when they 
scanned the medications, one warning occurred when the vial of the antibiotics was not 
scanned before or after the dilute solution bag was scanned (2.3%), and another five 
alerts occurred when the dose of the medications scanned did not match with the order 
(11.6%), because only a partial dose of a vial or a pack needed to be administered. There 
were always some personnel other than patients and nurses who were involved in 
medication administration (n = 34, 79.1%), and in most of those cases, more than one 
party (e.g. physicians and pharmacists) played a role (n = 22, 51.2%). For instance, 
pharmacists were called for delivering some medications that were STAT orders or new 
orders (n = 15, 34.9%), or physicians were paged for a clarification about a specific 
medication order (n = 6, 14%). 
Qualitative Interviews 
The qualitative interviews were focused on the triggers of the operational 
problems the nurses had encountered before, or they had heard or seen them happen to 
someone else, as well as the problems they believed could happen in the future. 
Qualitative data analysis was informed by the conceptual framework that guided this 
study: 1) overall perceived impact of the BCMA on medication administration, 2) 
perceived technology related triggers of operational problems, 3) perceived tasks related 
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triggers of operational problems, 4) perceived environment related triggers of operational 
problems, 5) perceived person related triggers of operational problems, and 6) perceived 
organization related operational problems. Multiple minor themes emerged to support 
this classification.  
Overall Perceived Impact of BCMA on Medication Administration 
Participating nurses shared their overall perceptions about the impact of the use of 
the BCMA on the medication administration practice on a daily basis at the beginning of 
the interviews.  
Safety. The majority of the nurses perceived that the use of the BCMA could 
improve patient safety in terms of delivering the right medication to the right patient at 
the right time. Most nurses described the use of BCMA could prevent them from making 
mistakes when administering medications:  
“… I mean I feel safer. You get tired at the end of your shift. It is nice to just have 
another verification for your meds...” 
“…I’m very, very satisfied. I think it is a terrific tool for improving patient safety. 
Because we’re only human beings… people are busy and you can very easily miss 
something or give something...” 
Many nurses perceived that the use of BCMA made the medication administration 
more accurate. In a manner of speaking, it helped them better understand what the 
medications were they were delivering, when exactly the last dose was administered, and 
when the current dose should be giving:  
“…They (medications) are in their little packages… one of the positives is the 
nurse is saying, well I have this, this, and this for you and so if the patient isn’t taking one 
of those, they can say something and you know exactly what that pill cause it is still in its 
package…” 
“…I guess it makes us more on time for that (medication administration)…and 
then it allows us to see like the exact minutes instead of (hours)…if you’re giving a PRN 
medication, and it’s only Q4… the last person gave it at the 5’o clock hour, but is it 5:15 
or 5:50? It would make a big difference, whereas now with the scanner, it gives us an 
exact time….”  
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Efficiency. Majority of the nurses perceived that the use of BCMA improved 
their workflow, compared to the paper era, in terms of cutting off the multiple 
comparisons of the medications against the printed MAR and expediting the medication 
administration process:  
“…I think it’s definitely improved my patient care flow and the speed at which I 
can administer meds… where I first started working, we didn’t even have computers in 
the room. So it was very cumbersome to pass medications because you had to print out 
their entire MAR. Double check it, make sure you had it all right… and then in that time, 
if a doctor changed the orders, you didn’t know it until you got back on the computer… 
and that could have been a whole hour before you’re on a computer again. So from that 
experience to now, it is so much better cause, if a doctor makes a change on a med, I’m 
gonna see it because I have to get on a computer before I can give it…” 
Some nurses also pointed out that since the BCMA could pick up the order 
automatically when physicians prescribed or changed it, it benefited the patient care in an 
efficient manner: 
 “…It changes the efficiency of the patients getting precisely what the physicians 
want them to receive...” 
“…And then if something that was ordered…the doses slightly got changed, the 
computer will pick up on it...” 
Stress. Despite being considered as a tool that improved patient safety and work 
efficiency, the use of BCMA was believed as stressful by a few nurses because of the 
added steps they had to go through before the verification was checked out by the 
computer. Sometimes, stigma arose:   
“…I mean it can be stressful when there are a lot of people in the room and you 
have to try and scan, and the wristband doesn’t scan, you get a big red box on the 
computer you have to hit cancel before you can scan again, so you have to walk back and 
forth between the computer and the patient several times…”  
“…I think there’s that added stress a little bit when you get caught up doing stuff 
in the morning and your last patient doesn’t get their meds until 10… things are 
documented at 10 and they were due at 8...” 
Overdependence.  It is noteworthy that a number of the nurses perceived 
overdependence on the use of BCMA. They believed nurses over relied on the 
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verification performed by the BCMA, instead of performing the “5 right” themselves. In 
a worse case, when nurses suspected it was not the right medication when the BCMA 
verified oppositely, they would trust the BCMA and proceeded with the medication 
administration, which would dramatically endanger patient safety: 
“…I mean if we’re scanning a med and it’s not the med that we think it is. But it’s 
telling us it’s the right med, sometimes people tend to rely on the scanning more than 
they should… So making sure even though you’re scanning, it gives you a safety blanket 
but you also have to check what you’re giving...”  
Some other nurses described that with the application of the BCMA, nurses 
nowadays just physically scanned what they needed to deliver, without critically thinking 
about the effects of these medications, or the plan of care of a specific patient in a holistic 
way:  
“…I know that I still do my safety checks and everything, but I feel like it almost 
takes away thinking about the meds, nurses especially, like why are they getting the med? 
Do they need it? You’re like go over here, get the med, scan, scan, scan, take these 
meds…Yeah, it kind of takes away some of the thought process...” 
Even when the BCMA has some sort of functions to support nurses’ decision 
making, it is still easy to be missed: 
“…You have to be able to judge like if some one’s heart rate is too low, am I 
going to give them this Lopressor? But some people don’t, they just scan, scan, scan… 
and there is usually a note in there that will say, don’t give if they’re less than 60. What 
would be nice would be a little prompt or something, like our IV pumps do… so like next 
to the medication there’s this little yellow thing that you have to hover over to see the 
directions...” 
The majority of the nurses perceived that the use of BCMA indeed improved 
patient safety and work efficiency in a variety of forms, just as how it was designed and 
expected to function. However, simultaneously, some nurses identified that the BCMA 
could introduce stressfulness and overdependence, and these issues would jeopardize 
patient safety in a different, but more inattentive, way.  
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When the nurses moved on to the operational problems of BCMA they had 
encountered in real work environment, they described the operational problems as a 
result of 5 different contributors. 
Perceived Technology Related Triggers of Operational Problems 
The majority of the nurses perceived that operational problems of BCMA were 
due to the hardware and/or software of BCMA, some were expected or predictable and 
some others were not.  
Frustration caused by the cord. The cord connecting the scanner to the 
computer was the most frequent issue reported by almost every nurse, which always 
frustrated nurses, especially when the cord could not reach the patient who was away 
from the computer or multiple scans were needed before the scanner could catch the 
barcode on the wristband.  
“…The only thing I would say about that is the cord… like in bed 1, the computer 
is on this side and if they’re on the chair on the other side of the bed, you’ve gotta walk 
around and stretch this thing way over there…” 
“…I would say just the fact that it’s on a cord and like having to maneuver... If 
the patient is in the hallway and going for a test and they get nauseous, and so you want 
to give them something real quick, before they leave and you can’t scan it because the 
cord isn’t going to reach into the hallway, so you just got to override it...” 
System backstage glitches. Some nurses reported that sometimes, the system 
would not register the medication administration after all the medications were 
successfully scanned, verified, delivered, and documented in the eMAR. Nurses would 
not even know until the next time they logged into the system to deliver patient care.  
“…Sometimes when you scan a barcode and you click accept, the machine won’t 
register that you scanned it so when you go back in the MAR, even though you gave the 
med and there is no warning that says you didn’t give it. It comes up as not given in the 
MAR, so you have to go back in and manually put in ‘yes I gave this’, so that’s been a 
little bit annoying...” 
“…So now my biggest problem that I have had is that I have scanned all the 
meds, clicked that I gave them, and then later in the day, I go back and find that none of 
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it was documented and I don’t know why that happened. But then I have to go back and 
then individually…because of course I don’t have the barcodes at that time because I 
have already dispensed the stuff, so that’s for me, probably the biggest thing that 
sometimes it doesn’t capture, and then you have to follow up and go back and fix it…” 
Another trigger of operational problem reported by the nurse which is related to 
the glitches in the system is that after the nurses scanned the medication, the system 
alerted that the order did not exist, when the order was not actually discontinued at all.  
“…The other day a patient had an order for an IV fluid. I think it was D5.45 with 
20 of K. I double-checked it with her (another nurse) and it wouldn’t scan. It kept saying 
‘patient doesn’t have an order’. So we had to call the pharmacy and they had to 
discontinue the order and reput the order in, and then it worked. But things like that 
where it had the order, I have the right med. It’s not working. So it’s delaying my care. 
There’s no reason for it...” 
System delays or shutdown. The nurses reported that when experiencing system 
or computer shutdown, they would have to wait for it coming back or restored, and 
therefore their medication administration would be delayed.  
“…I mean you could be giving your meds, and all of a sudden it’s time for a 
windows update, it shuts the computer down...” 
“…Our computers don’t run on batteries. So when I tried to move the computer, it 
became unplugged, and then I had to wait for it to reboot…”  
When a STAT order was made with an existing stand order, there could be a 
delay in the system for the new STAT order being transmitted to the Omnicell before the 
nurse could pull the medication out of it.  
“…There are some meds like different electrolyte supplementations. If they have a 
standing BID order for certain electrolytes, and then they add another electrolyte for that 
day on top of it, it’s sometimes complicated how you can retrieve those meds from the 
Omnicell and how you can scan them. Because there’s some lag in the system that says 
that that med was already given, even if it’s a separate order...” 
The technology-related triggers of operational problems reported by the nurses are 
mostly unpredictable by nurses and always cause a hard stop during medication 
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administration. Nurses often feel frustrated when the reason contributing to the hard stop 
is unknown and they are even unable to override the system to proceed with the operation.  
Perceived BCMA Tasks Related Triggers of Operational Problems 
Specific task-related triggers of problems are discussed below. 
Specific medication barcode is unavailable. Some medications may have 
multiple barcodes on manufacturer packaging with different functions, which could be 
confusing for nurses to scan.  
“…The Lidoderm patches has two barcodes on it. It has one in the front and one 
in the back. One works, and one doesn’t. So you have to grab the right barcode. It’s a 
manufacturer thing...” 
Some packaging or pills don’t have a rip on them. When nurses have to deliver 
partial dose of a pack or a pill, the packaging often got damaged after the entire dose was 
separated, and the barcode on the packaging was hard to be caught because of that.  
“…Sometimes, like the Colace pills, they don’t rip. They come in these big packs. 
And they don’t rip apart too well. So I’ve definitely had times where I’ve ripped the 
barcode. So then you have to leave the ripped one in there and get a different one. It 
depends on the medications that, just the ones that come in the big…” 
 The barcodes of some narcotics or other controlled substances, which nurses 
often had to waste a partial dose, were very easily to be ditched before the barcodes were 
scanned, because this operation happened before the nurses went to the patient room. 
Even for regular medications, it was not a rare case when nurses threw away the vial or 
the packaging before the barcode was scanned. In those scenarios, nurses would have to 
either override the system, or retrieve another intact dose and scan the barcode of it:  
“…Like for Lasix, if I had gotten rid of that little vial before I had scanned it, 
you’ll probably get a 50/50 split of answers on the unit. A lot of people will just say 
‘barcode unreadable’, or ‘barcode unavailable’ because they got rid of it. If it’s 
something that I can reproduce, then I’ll try to go back to the Omnicell, pull out another 
vial of Lasix to be able to scan it and then return the extra one just so I can scan the 
correct medication because I know that they audit trails of barcodes being unreadable or 
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barcodes being unavailable and have suspicion of ‘are you administering the right 
medication?’ But it creates a lot of extra work to have to go back, pull out another one, 
take it to the patient’s room, scan it, go back to the Omnicell and return that 
medication…” 
“…One thing I’ve run into is we have to waste our medications if they are a 
narcotic or a controlled substance in the Omnicell before we give it cause a lot of times 
they’re just partial doses, so if you forget to bring that vial with you, and you accidentally 
put it into the sharps already, then sometimes that causes a problem. We’re used to the 
old way where we would waste and then dump the like a Dilaudid syringe. I know I’ve 
done that before, and I know that other nurses have done that, too, where they 
accidentally put it into the sharps after wasting...” 
Medication barcode mismatches the medication. Sometimes, barcode can be 
wrong, which requires nurses to visual check of the medication. This is the time when 
nurses’ past training and experiences become crucial for patient safety:  
“…Sometimes, it (medication) doesn’t always correlate to what the computer says 
it is. So it’ll say this is past its expiration date, or this is inappropriate, so then you have 
to go ‘okay, barcode not available’, because sometimes, what pharmacy prints out and 
what the computer is seeing don’t match...” 
“…But I guess there’s been issues where that barcode isn’t matching what the 
med actually is. It’s scanning and it’s saying that it was the right med but it wasn’t...” 
Wristband barcode is unapproachable. A number of the nurses reported that 
the multiple barcodes or the outworn barcode on patients’ wristband always impeded the 
process of medication administration and created extra work along with the difficulties 
the cord had brought about.   
“…The patient wristband has multiple different scanning options, so there is one 
that is used for phlebotomy, there is one that is used for medication, and one that is used 
for to check a blood sugar, so you have to isolate the one that you need; otherwise it is 
going to pick up one of the other ones and then you have to redo it…” 
“…If a patient has been here for a long time, their wristband gets worn out. So 
that’s why it stops being able to scan...” 
“…If it (the barcode) doesn’t pick up the first time, you have to walk back and 
edit it and go back around, so a wireless system would be amazing…” 
System’s “Tenacity”. It was reported by the nurses that the eMAR would not 
allow nurses to adjust the time of medication administration, when nurses delayed or 
brought forward administering a scheduled medication for a good reason:  
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“…When you get new orders for a medication, like you’re supposed to give 
potassium 10 mEq once a day and they change it to 10 mEq twice a day. And they change 
it at like 10:00 and maybe you’re a little bit late giving your medications because you are 
busy. It (the system) thinks that the first order was DC’ed (discontinued) and then, it 
doesn’t populate the MAR with the BID order until a timing of 9:00. So you get caught in 
this. It asks you ‘Do you want to administer this? This order is not set to start until the 
future. Do you want to administer it?’ But it won’t let you go back to the order. It’s still 
the same order… then you’ll end up having to document that you’re administering the 
new dose early and then going back that you didn’t give the other dose. So there’s some 
overlap issues when there’s some new orders...” 
“…One of the issues with the EMAR is it, the minute that the physician writes an 
order, it populates onto the MAR. So if we are going to give heparin three times a day, 
it’s 6, 2, and 10. So they write for a heparin shot, say now (10:00). Well, I’m not going to 
give it to them at 10, I am going to give it to them at 2, so then it gets on that schedule, 
but unfortunately everything populates the moment that it is written for...” 
Another representation of “tenacity” of the system reported by the nurses was that 
nurses were not autonomous regarding adjusting doses of medications:  
“…I have an extra order for potassium because they have a low K in the morning 
but they get a standing dose of 10 or 20 daily, you have to give them separately. Like you 
have to accept them and then you have to go back and scan everything again, even 
though both doses are there. It’s the same with insulin. You’re doing a lot of double 
clicking to give your entire dose of insulin, like if they have a sliding scale and meal 
coverage...” 
Among the tasks related triggers of operational problems reported by the nurses, 
some are contributed by the manufacturer, which seem not hard to be fixed, while some 
other are generated by the computer system, which required interdisciplinary 
collaboration to optimize the system.  
Perceived Environment Related Triggers of Operational Problems 
The environment related triggers of operational problems were described 
consistently across nurses, and from two different perspectives: the limitation of the work 
platform and the limitation of the workspace.  
Limitation of the work platform. Most nurses expressed that they were not 
satisfied with the design of the work platform for medication administration at patients’ 
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bedside. There was a tray that nurses could pull out under the computer, but it was a little 
high for a lot of nurses and always occupied by supplies.  
“…The platform you use to prepare the medications is not user friendly. You got 
the computer up here, you got the keyboard here, then you got the little thing here, and 
most of the computers are on an angle so sometimes stuff starts sliding, especially if 
you’re short. If you’re really short you can’t get to the top of the computer...” 
“…I’d open the meds and put the wrappers on the keyboard, and I wouldn’t be 
able to type. I don’t think there’s enough room at all to prepare medications. There is a 
tray on the wall. Yeah it’s usually occupied by other stuff and I’m like shorter. So 
sometimes, I’m like reaching my arms up, and I feel awkward opening my medications 
where I wish I had something more at chest level. So I could open them up downwards 
instead of upwards and have them fling everywhere...” 
Limitation of the workspace. This type of operational problems was generally 
related to the layout of the patient room. It’s very conspicuous nowadays is because 
nurses make much more movements at patients’ beside during medication administration, 
compared to the era when nurses do not necessarily move around:     
“…Like if there is a lot going on in the room, or if their room is really cluttered 
or the computer where I tend to lay out my meds before I scan them is really crowded, 
sometimes I get a little anxious because I want to make sure that I get all the meds, and I 
don’t want something to slip under their blanket or a pillowcase...” 
“…Just with how small the rooms are, like there’s a bed and a chair and all the 
equipment… it’s ergonomically (difficult), and then just frustrating taking the scanner 
walking around the room…” 
Although there are several elements that compose the physical environment of 
patients’ room, like light and noise, the nurses mostly considered the layout of the room 
and the design of the work platform could be improved to facilitate the medication 
administration practice.  
Perceived Person Related Triggers of Operational Problems 
Majority of the nurses agreed that it was challenging and cumbersome to deliver 
medications, when patients were under special circumstances: emergency and/or isolation. 
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Emergency situations. When patients are in emergency situations, the workflow 
of medication administration will be adjusted accordingly. The medication orders will 
primarily be oral orders prescribed by healthcare providers, which haven’t been 
registered in the eMAR. Nurses will have to administer the medications before they are 
ordered or documented, but keep the corresponding vial or packaging for later 
documentation. However sometimes, the nurse who administered the medication doesn’t 
even know the physicians who were involved in the rescue. The nurses reported that it 
could be hard for them to track physicians down and complete the whole documentation 
process afterwards:  
“…I had a verbal order from the doctor to give 4 of morphine because my patient 
was having a heart attack. The CCMU fellow was there. I said, ‘ I’m giving 4 of 
morphine’, and she said, ‘okay’. And then I never got an order to link it. I needed them to 
place an order so I could link my override. When I reached out to that CCMU fellow, she 
said ‘I never… I didn’t tell you to give that… well you have to get the order from the 
physician who told you that’. But I don’t know his name! He was a cardiologist; he was 
at the bedside with her. So I had to hunt him down and it was this long drawn out process 
for no reason when she was at the bedside. It shouldn’t have been that difficult, 
especially when the patient was having a heart attack...”   
Patients in isolation. When delivering medications to the patient who is in 
isolation, nurses will have to take necessary precaution before they enter the isolated 
patient room. The nurses described that they had to come up with some strategies to 
avoid violating policies or the repeated dressing when making multiple trips in and out.  
“…I find isolation to be annoying, and that’s why things have to be done very 
systematically because it’s kind of annoying to be putting on the gown, taking off the 
gown. It’s time consuming, too. So you have to make sure that you’ve got everything you 
need. And I will always take more into the room, like maybe they want this PRN, maybe 
they don’t want their Tums, not narcotics of course, but I will take some Mylicon for 
example, so that you’re amply prepared. But isolation rooms are time consuming...” 
“…In contact rooms, it’s more of a nuisance because you have to think, but you 
can’t take the whole insulin syringe in there because it’s a contact room, so you really 
have to prepare that in the med room. So you have to be cognizant of what you’re taking 
in there and what you need. We had an issue with a multi-dose vial, so the patient was 
requiring PRN Labetalol frequently, and somebody had left the Labetalol at the bedside 
  71 
because they took it into the room. It’s not a medication that can be left at the bedside, 
but it’s a multi-dose vial, and they don’t want you to prepare it in the (medication room). 
So they have come up with some of those things can get multiple stickers, but still you’re 
preparing it in the med room then...” 
Although there are other individuals who always present on the scene when 
nurses deliver medications at patients’ bedside, like families or other disciplines, the 
nurses did not consider these individuals as distraction or obstacles. Only when patients 
who are in emergency or isolation did the nurses realize operational problems were 
generated.  
Perceived Organization Related Triggers of Operational Problems 
Nurses collaborate with multiple disciplines in hospital when passing medications, 
where most of the collaboration takes place with pharmacists. After physicians place 
medication orders in the eMAR, the orders will be transferred to the pharmacy for 
pharmacists to verify, prepare, and deliver the medications on to the floor. The nurses 
recognized that pharmacy often delay with the verification and the delivery of 
medications. 
Delayed verification of medications. The nurses indicated that it always took a 
lot more time than they expected to get the medication verified by the pharmacy, which 
could dramatically endanger patient safety. Sometimes, whey would have to override the 
system or workaround the policy to obtain or pass the medications.  
“…Sometimes what will happen is that pharmacy will take forever to verify 
something and you’re like, ‘Does pharmacy have not verify this? Do you want to override 
it?’ Yes, I want to override it! Because it’s like they just changed one Motrin to a new 
Motrin and it’s like they changed 400 to 600 milligrams. Same medication…” 
“…You call pharmacy and ask them to verify it. One time I had a big safety issue, 
like they started him on Sotalol because he was doing lots of VTac (ventricular 
tachycardia) and I called pharmacy and was waiting like an hour. I called them 3 times 
to verify the medication so I could get it from pharmacy. Still wasn’t verified. My patient 
went into sustained VTac for like 2 minutes while he was in the bathroom, so the service 
calls the pharmacy to try to get the Sotalol and it still takes an hour to get it down here. 
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So issues like that happen a lot. You got to do what you got to do…Yeah, because of 
patient safety. They need the medications...” 
Delayed delivery of medications. The nurses also reported that, after the 
pharmacy verified medications, there still could be a delay with the delivery of the 
medications, especially when patients were transferred between different departments.   
“…One of the biggest problems is there’s only one pharmacy for the hospital now. 
So let’s say they make their runs on the half hour. So they start on 6. They do 5, they go 
down to Med-ops, they go to surg-ops, and then they come back up here. So theoretically, 
they can order a medication at 7:30, and you might not get it until 9, or even the 10:00 
run. So there’s a delay sometimes when they verify it, when it gets delivered…” 
“…Like scheduled meds, that should be there. They have been on these meds for a 
few days. Yeah and they are not there, and they are due, and they have still not been 
delivered. Especially when you have transplant medications, stuff that is really important. 
We have more difficulty when they come from the ICU; I think it takes a little bit for our 
pharmacy to catch up with them, and that can be a real difficulty…” 
The nurses described that physicians always responded to their request in a timely 
manner, whereas pharmacy often impeded the efficient implementation of medication 
administration. It was reported frustrating and time consuming for nurses to address 
unverified or undelivered medications with the pharmacists. 
Discussion 
The results of this study mostly validate the findings of the triggers of operational 
problems yielded in the literature review in the Chapter II, although there are some 
differences noted.  
Technology and Tools Related Triggers of Operational Problems 
Firstly, the cord of the scanner, which always got intertwined between the 
computer and patient, was the most frequently reported technology-related operational 
problems by nurses in this study. Koppel, Wetterneck [32] reported the same finding in 
their study. Multiple scan attempts were needed until the scanner could pick up the 
barcode. This was a common finding across this study and the literature [13, 17, 27-29], due to 
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the technology capability [13]. But in this paper, this type of operational problem will be 
considered as task related operational problems, rather than technology issues, because 
the reason why this has been happening is either because the quality of the barcodes is 
imperfect, or the barcode is just missing, whereas the barcode scanning is the tasks nurses 
are trying to accomplish. Technology related operational problems owing to system 
delays or shutdown were overwhelmingly found in the literature [27, 32-35, 41, 43]. Another 
significant outcome of this study is that sometimes the medication order was not in the 
system by the time it was due because of backstage glitches. Koppel, Wetterneck [32] 
described the same finding, but it’s as a consequence of a stat, verbal, or not yet entered 
order. When talking about different BCMA systems utilized in different hospitals, 
technology related operational problems could perform in different ways. 
Tasks Related Triggers of Operational Problems 
It is readily apparent that barcode issues are the most common operational 
problems encountered by nurses in this study, as well as throughout the literature [13, 17, 20, 
27-31, 36-38, 44]. As discussed above, this type of difficulties are considered as task related. 
Barcodes on medication packages or patient wristband could be missing, broken, or 
blurred. Novak, Anders [36] reported the barcode could be wrong, which required nurses 
must to visual check of the medication, which was also uncovered in this study. Some 
medications, take narcotics for example, need to be wasted a partial dose before nurses 
come to patient room, and it is easily to dispose the vial with the barcode on it before it is 
scanned, which has not been reported in the literature. The system does not allow nurses 
to adjust the time of medication administration or the dose of the medication to be 
delivered. These issues also found in this study were defined as “system tenacity” by 
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other researchers [36, 38, 42]. Without this delegation, nurses have to go through several 
unnecessary steps and spend extra time to accomplish medication administration.   
Organization Related Triggers of Operational Problems 
Organization related triggers to operational problems primarily refer to the 
collaboration between nurses and other disciplines, specifically physicians and 
pharmacists. Physicians are always responsive for medication related questions, whereas 
pharmacists are a different story. Due to the nature of pharmacists’ work, there is often a 
delay for medication verification and/or delivery onto the floor, especially when there is 
patient who is transferred from the emergency room (ER) or has a stat order. In the 
literature, this challenge was not heavily reported. Only Novak [42] narrated a similar 
situation in her qualitative study that when a patient came from the ER, it was frustrating 
for nurses to administer carried medications, because the BCMA was not applied in the 
ER, and the medications were not verified by the pharmacy. Carayon, Wetterneck [27] 
also introduced interruption, commonly initiated by families, patients, and physicians, as 
an organization related operational problems. However, in this study, nurses considered 
an interruption from families or patients as a valuable opportunity for communication, 
education, and assessment. The way that nurses dealt with physicians’ interruption was a 
little tricky. During the observation, some nurses were very confident to tell the 
physicians that they need to finish medication administration before then could talk, if 
this was not an emergency, while some others were hesitate about what should do. 
Environment Related Triggers of Operational Problems 
Regarding the environment of the medication room and patient room, nurses 
perceived that it was always not enough space for them to perform the medication 
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administration. The room configuration is not user-friendly. Some nurses even did not 
turn on the light to verify medications during the night shift. These issues were 
commonly seen through the literature [27, 32]. 
Person Related Triggers of Operational Problems 
It is demonstrated in this study that, when patients are under special 
circumstances, like emergency or isolation, it is challenging for nurses to conduct 
medication administration using BCMA. This was approved by several studies [27, 32, 34, 35]. 
It was also reported in a couple of studies that nurses with inadequate BCMA training 
may not be familiar with BCMA usage [32, 43]. This situation was not counted in this study, 
probably because nurses who had not been working on the floor over a year were 
excluded from the study. 
The findings of this study indicate that while nurses addressed that the BCMA 
made the medication administration practice safer and more efficient, it also brought 
nurses about extra stress and overdependence on the technology. These findings are 
partially consistent with the work of Morriss Jr, Abramowitz [45] and Hurley, Bane [46], 
which reported that nurses considered BCMA as an assistance in performing the 5 rights 
of medication administration and felt safer when medication orders were not required to 
transcribed to paper medication sheets any more. Although they thought that using 
BCMA was more time consuming, nurses believed that the extra time they spent to 
assure verification was worth it [45, 46]. Nurses reported that stress that resulted from 
computer breakdowns was greater than that resulted from other situations [45]; whereas in 
this study, nurses’ stress primarily came from the time pressure when a medication 
administration was passed due, or the distraction impeding nurses from concentrating on 
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medication administration at patient’s bedside. Sandelowski [47] showed in the study that 
operational problems of BCMA could actually be created when users did not rely on their 
own clinical judgment as a result of the availability of the technology, which is also 
demonstrated in this study and another one [32]. The results of this study demonstrate that 
BCMA will function and serve in the way it was designed and expected, as long as it is 
used properly; otherwise, it could bring about side effects, which could undermine patient 
safety and nurse job satisfaction. 
This study has several limitations. A convenience sample was used. The majority 
of nurses had a baccalaureate degree, which is not nationally representative. There was 
only one study site with 4 medical/surgical units recruited in the study. Even within this 
study site, the BCMA system is used differently across units, and therefore the workflow 
is inconsistent. Importantly, only one person (the study PI) analyzed and classified the 
data thus investigator bias may be present. Finally, Hawthorne effect may interfere with 
the findings of this study. However, several studies have shown a negligible effect on the 
results through the direct observation [4, 48-50].  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, despite the existing limitations, the results of this study largely 
support the literature review on the triggers to operational problems of BCMA as 
analyzed by work system factors as categorized by the SEIPS model. The researcher was 
able to categorize all observations into the 5 elements of the SEIPS work system. When 
nurses were asked what types of work system triggers contributed to the operational 
problems, all of their responses could be classified by the 5 elements of the SEIPS works 
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system. The study extends the literature review by providing extensive detail on nurses’ 
perceptions about BCMA operational problems.  
Next steps are to explore the adaptations of nurses in the face of operational 
problems. The adaptation strategies nurses come up with these operational problems 
could inform future practice or system design.    
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Appendix I Interview Guide 
Hello, Subject ID. My name is: Interviewer’s name. I am conducting a research study on 
nurses’ performance with bar-code technology, and I would like to ask you to consider 
participating. I have IRB approved for this project, and I have a consent form. Would you 
be interested? If yes, I will go over the consent form with you. If no, thank you for your 
time.  
Interviewer completes consent process. ONCE consented observation is conducted, 
proceed with the following: 
 
Interviewer to start audio recorder and state the following before interview begins: 
A. Subject ID 
B. Site ID 
C. Date 
D. Time 
 
I am going to be asking you some questions about your experience of medication 
administration using bar-code medication administration system, hereinafter referred as 
BCMA.  
 
1. How long have you been working on the unit? How long have you been using 
BCMA to administer medications? 
Probe: How long have you been trained before it was implemented on the floor? 
 
2. Overall, how satisfied are you with the BCMA?  
Probe: If not satisfied, in what way? 
 
3. How do you think the BCMA has impacted your work experience in the hospital? 
Probe: The impact could be reflected in modified workflow, work efficiency, 
pattern of prioritization, the way of managing patient care, stressfulness, etc. 
 
4. Are there any difficulties/problems you have encountered in the past with the 
BCMA since it has been implemented in the hospital? 
Probe: Are there any difficulties you encountered that were related to the BCMA 
itself, including software and hardware?  
 
Are there any difficulties you encountered that were related to the tasks that you 
were trying to accomplish (e.g., a number of medications, medications that 
needed to be checked out on the unit, bulk of medication were used)? 
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Are there any difficulties you encountered that were related to the environment 
(e.g., light, noise, people around, crowdedness)?  
 
Are there any difficulties you encountered that were related to the communication 
or collaboration between you and staff you work with (e.g., physicians, 
pharmacists, nurse assistants)?  
 
Are there any difficulties you encountered that were related to the condition of the 
patient (e.g., isolation, rest, critical or emergency conditions)? 
 
Do you think these difficulties you described could jeopardize patient safety? 
 
5. Are there any difficulties/problems you think will continue to happen with the 
BCMA in the future? 
Probe: Are there any difficulties you encountered that were related to the BCMA 
itself, including software and hardware?  
 
Are there any difficulties you encountered that were related to the tasks that you 
were trying to accomplish (e.g., a number of medications, medications that 
needed to be checked out on the unit, bulk of medication were used)? 
 
Are there any difficulties you encountered that were related to the environment 
(e.g., light, noise, people around, crowdedness)?  
 
Are there any difficulties you encountered that were related to the communication 
or collaboration between you and staff you work with (e.g., physicians, 
pharmacists, nurse assistants)?  
 
Are there any difficulties you encountered that were related to the condition of the 
patient (e.g., isolation, rest, critical or emergency conditions)? 
 
Do you think these difficulties you described could jeopardize patient safety? 
 
6. When you found it was hard to strictly follow the protocol when you encountered 
difficulties/ problems with the BCMA, could you briefly describe how you 
handled that? 
Probe: What were you thinking about when you handled it, or what factors 
determined the way you handled it? 
 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
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Appendix II Themes of Qualitaitve Interviews 
Major Themes  Minor Themes 
1. Overall Perceived Impact of the 
use of BCMA On Medication 
Administration 
1) Safety 
2) Efficiency 
3) Stress 
4) Overdependence 
2. Perceived Technology Related 
Triggers of Operational Problems 
1) Frustration caused by the cord 
2) System backstage glitches 
3) System delays or shutdown 
3. Perceived Tasks Related Triggers 
of Operational Problems 
1) Medication barcode is unavailable 
2) Medication barcode mismatches the medication 
3) Wristband barcode is unapproachable 
4) System’s “Tenacity” 
4. Perceived Environment Related 
Triggers of Operational Problems 
1) Limitation of the work platform 
2) Limitation of the workspace 
5. Perceived Person Related Triggers 
of Operational Problems 
1) Emergency situations 
2) Patients in isolation 
6. Perceived Organization Related 
Triggers of Operational Problems 
1) Delayed verification of medications 
2) Delayed delivery of medications 
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Chapter IV 
Bar-Code Medication Administration System and Nurse Adaptations 
Introduction 
Medication administration errors (MAEs) are a common issue that threatens 
patient safety and quality of care in hospitals. Despite accreditation standards, public 
policies and the availability of evidence for reducing MAEs during hospitalization, 
MAEs continue to be national patient safety issue [1-3]. This may be, in part, because the 
process of medication administration is complex, and a number of opportunities exist for 
MAEs to occur [4]. In order to mitigate the risk to patient safety, the use of barcode 
medication administration (BCMA) system to verify a patient’s identity and the 
medication to be administered is a promising strategy for preventing MAEs.  
In the computer technology field, it is well accepted that “no technology is 
exception-free and no simple technology is available to remove exceptions from 
workflow” [5]. It is known that the implementation of health IT may introduce additional 
risks into the environment of care as a result of either design or implementation failures 
[6, 7] or unintended consequences [8]. The reason why this happens is likely because the 
health care environment is complex, which may create operational problems [9, 10].  
Operational problems are defined as “any occurrence or state that makes goal 
accomplishment impossible, difficult, or unsatisfying in light of standards for timely and 
effective performance.” [11] Adaptation, known as “problem solving”, is any type of 
responses performed by the nurses to their perceived problems, in order to accomplish 
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some pre-established goals, which is already set by standards for timely and effective 
performance within the context of a system or process.” [11] The definitions of 
“operational problems” and “adaptations” clearly explicate that adaptations are goal-
oriented behavior. When operational problems are considered as necessary consequences 
of complex work or environment, nurses are unavoidably engaged in “adaptations” [12, 13]. 
However, efforts to understand BCMA’s impact on nursing work have largely 
focused on nursing workarounds, which are a specific type of adaptations [11, 14]. 
Workarounds are generally considered as deviations from BCMA use protocols [7], while 
adaptations are a broader category of changes to the work practices or the technology. In 
addition, workarounds are often studied under the assumption that workarounds are 
inherently dangerous and a threat to patient safety [7, 15-17]; whereas, adaptations do not 
have to be negative; they could be neutral or even positive (see Table 4.1).  In fact, some 
of today’s best practices were yesterday’s adaptations; some of today’s adaptations could 
also be tomorrow’s best practices [18]. Adaptations are dynamic responses by people to 
the operational problems and altering of work practices to accommodate the technology 
[19]. In the context of health IT, adaptations can be situational, but they can also become 
institutionalized in formal and informal ways. 
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Table 4.1 
Contrast Between Workarounds and Adaptations 
Workarounds Adaptations 
Performed at individual level Performed at individual or institutional 
level 
Typically only one single step in the process Could be multiple steps in the process, 
multiple decisions  
Interpreted as negative behaviors because 
not compliant with the practice protocol 
Interpreted as neutral or positive 
behaviors even though not compliant with 
the practice protocol 
Involving action at single point in time to 
deliver the medication 
Involving deliberate decisions to 
accommodate the work system 
 
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework guiding this study is an integration of the SEIPS 
model and a sociotechnical perspective considering that operational problems occur 
because of collisions between the “System Frame” and the “Practice Frame”. The system 
frame is the way the work and operational system is functionalized and implemented, 
based on the cumulative assumptions, decisions, priorities, and problem-solving of the 
vendor, developers and implementation decision-makers [20].  In this study, the work 
system within the SEIPS model was adopted to characterize dimensions of the system 
frame relevant to BCMA.   
The practice frame that drives nurses medication administration practices includes 
safety, efficiency, and the “5Rs” (right patient, right medication, right time, right dose, 
and right route) of medication administration. The highlighted area is the purpose of this 
study, in terms of understanding the process of nurse adaptations to operational problems 
of BCMA (see Figure 4.1).  
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Figure 4.1. BCMA and adaptation.  
Problem Statement and Purpose of this study 
Research studies that attempt to understand BCMA’s impact on nursing work 
have largely focused on nursing workarounds [11, 14]. Whereas, adaptations, as a broader 
dynamic process involving nurses’ behaviors of the accommodation to the operational 
problems of BCMA, has been understudied [11, 14]. No studies have explored the rationale 
of adaptive behaviors of nurses in response to the operational problems of BCMA. There 
has been a call for further research to better understand how an increase in emphasis on 
timely medication administration affects decision tradeoffs during goal conflicts [26]. 
Factors that may contribute to this are unavailable methods in hospital for conducting a 
comprehensive assessment [18], complexity of studying the entwined processes of 
adaptations [7], BCMA’s evolving nature and evolving work rules [7], and nurses’ negative 
impression and resistance about workarounds. It is believed that when there are large 
gaps between intended practice, as recommended or mandated in policies and procedures, 
and actual practice, predictable problems emerges [27]. 
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Thus, the purpose of this study was to understand existing operational problems 
that are hindering efficient nursing work, how nurses respond to operational problems, 
and nurses’ perception about the adaptations they made to effectively prevent MAEs and 
improve patient safety by better functioning BCMA. The research questions are: 1) can 
nurse adaptations to the operational problems of BCMA be interpreted in a scientific 
way? and 2) can the perceptions of nurses about the adaptations to the operational 
problems of BCMA be interpreted through interviews? 
Methods 
Aims and Design 
The aims of this study were to: 1) investigate nurses’ adaptations when 
encountering operational problems of BCMA, and 2) explore nurses’ perceptions about 
adaptations of BCMA. 
To better understand the process of adaptation when nurses encounter operational 
problems of BCMA, a prospective exploratory research design was applied in the study 
to collect, synthesize, and interpret the data. Scenario interviews with follow-up were the 
approaches used to explore nurses’ perceptions of adaptations to operational problems of 
BCMA.  It is critical to collect data by combining scenario interview and follow-up 
interviews, since either of them could reveal only one face of the coin, while the two 
approaches can cross complement each other with the missed information.  
Sample 
A purposive sampling method was employed. The target enrollment was 30 
nurses for scenarios and interviews about BCMA adaptive behaviors, with plans to enroll 
nurse participants only until data saturation was reached. Inclusion criteria were: 1) 
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permanent staff RNs; 2) working on identified medical and surgical adult acute care units; 
3) having been working on the unit for at least one year (including unit based temporary 
staff); 4) having been trained to use BCMA; and 5) having experience in using BCMA. 
Exclusion criteria were nurses from central staffing resource (i.e., CSR temporary staff 
on a specific unit). 
Setting 
This study was conducted in 4 medical-surgical units (labeled as A, B, C, D in 
this study) of a large academic medical center located in the Mid West of the United 
States. The scenario interviews and follow-up interviews were both conducted in the 
conference room of each designated unit. The Institutional Review Board of the study site 
approved the study. 
Data Collection Methods 
1. Development of the interview guide for scenario interviews 
The operational problems synthesized and validated in the previous studies were 
used as resources to create scenarios, which addressed one or more of the 5 dimensions of 
the work system (individuals, technology, organization, environment, and tasks) (see 
Table 4.3). The operational problems that were reported in the literature, but not 
identified in the study site were excluded from the scenario development. The scenarios 
were reviewed by a nurse specialist of the study site, who persistently oversees and audits 
the compliance report of BCMA scanning across the entire medical system. 
Modifications were made accordingly. Two cases studies with 4 scenarios each 
(operational problems) were generated. Case studies provide the clinical context of a 
hospital patient who needs to receive medications administered by a nurse. Scenarios are 
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examples of medication management events within the context of the case studies that 
demonstrate one or more work system triggers to operational problems. Open-ended 
questions were asked to the nurses to describe what they would do within specific 
scenarios. 
  95 
Table 4.2  
Characteristics of Scenarios  
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Scenarios 
 
System Frame 
Person  Technology Organization Tasks Environment 
Case 1: Patient John Doe, male, 82 years old, admitted 4 days ago, diagnosed with heart failure, pneumonia, type II diabetes, 
and urinary tract infection. Patient is receiving Digoxin® tablets 125 mg po QD, Rocephin® 2g ivpb QD, Penicillin 250 mg po 
q.8h, and Humulin R® 3-6 units SQ PRN with meals, amount based on POC glucose. 
Scenario A: Missing label on medication. At 8 am, when 
the nurse prepares the medication, she finds the label of 
the par stock insulin has run out. 
  X X  
Scenario B: Oral dosage changes prior to order 
verification. The physician just orally changed the dosage 
of the Digoxin from 125 mg daily to 250 mg daily, and it 
has not been verified by the pharmacy yet, so the nurse is 
unable to remove the dose from the Omnicell without 
preforming an override. 
  X X  
Scenario C: System alert. When the nurse scans the vial 
of the antibiotic, an alert pops up, and stating “missing 
component”. 
   X  
Scenario D: Dosage change prior to medication delivery. 
The physician just changed the dosage of Penicillin from 
250 mg q.8h to 500 mg q.8h, but the medication has not 
been delivered yet. 
  X X  
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Case 2: Patient Jane Doe, female, 24 years old, admitted 2 days ago, diagnosed with upper respiratory tract infection. Patient 
is receiving Ceclor 500mg PO BID. 
Scenario A: Unfavorable environment. At 9 pm, when the 
nurse comes to the patient room with the medication, she 
finds the patient is resting in a chair in front of the 
computer and the room is very dark, so she asks the 
patient if she can turn on the headlight briefly for the 
medication pass, but the patient refuses. The nurse is also 
unable to reach the computer. 
X    X 
Scenario B: Backstage glitches. Order and label both 
match, but computer alert indicates no active order. 
 X    
Scenario C: Medication administration interruption. The 
nurse is in the patient’s room passing the medication, 
while in the process of scanning the medication the 
physician comes in to speak with the nurse about the 
patient. 
    X 
Scenario D: Missing wristband. The patient wristband is 
found on the bedside table and not affixed to the patient. 
X   X  
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2. Development of the interview guide for follow-up interviews 
The factors that contributing to the adaptations nurses decide to take was 
addressed in the interviews. The development of the interview questions was guided by 
the Rational Model of Decision Making, which is a multi-step process for making choices 
between alternatives [28]. The process of rational decision-making favors logic, objectivity, 
and analysis over subjectivity and insight.  
The interview questions focused on nurses’ perceptions of their adaptive 
behaviors, including the operational problems they identified in the scenarios, the 
objectives they had when they had the operational problems, the alternatives they had 
besides the strategies they took, the evaluation of their performance (see Appendix I). By 
answering these questions, nurses reflected the factors that determined what they did in 
the scenarios interviews. The content validity was tested by sending the questions to three 
nurse specialists of the study sites. The content validity of the interview questions was 
0.65.  
Procedures 
1. On-site scenario interviews 
After obtaining IRB and Nursing Administration Research Committee approvals 
at the study site, a list of potentially eligible nurses from the Nurse Manager or designee 
(e.g. charge nurse) was obtained, upon arrival at the eligible unit sites. Nurses were 
randomly selected from this list and validated with the nurse manager or designee about 
their eligibility against the inclusion criteria. Eligible nurses were approached to 
participate in the study by obtaining a written informed consent. All the nurses who were 
recruited consented and participated in both the scenario interviews and the follow-up 
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interviews. The consented nurses then agreed on a time during that day to participate the 
scenario interviews.  
Scenario interviews were conducted in the conference room on the units. The 
researcher first introduced the purpose of the study and provided an initial instruction to 
the nurse, stating “please tell me what you are going to do step by step and what you are 
thinking, when you have these operational problems”. Then, the nurse was given a copy 
of the scenario description, and the scenario interview started. It is important to note that 
only the description of the scenarios was given to the nurses.  
The nurses were asked to constantly “think aloud” what they would do step by 
step during the scenario interviews, and if they paused for longer than a few seconds the 
research quietly reminded them to “keep thinking aloud.” Think aloud approach provide 
rich verbal data about reasoning during a problem solving process [29]. Using think aloud 
and protocol analysis, information that is concentrated on during problem solving and 
how that information is used to facilitate adaptation were identified. Aside from this talk, 
all interaction between the nurses and researcher was kept to a minimum so as not to 
interfere with the nurses’ flow of thoughts. The scenario interview was tape-recorded, 
and the researcher took field notes.    
2. Follow-up interviews 
At the end of each scenario interview session, a semi-structured follow-up 
interview was conducted in the same room with the nurses as a debriefing about why they 
took the adaptive strategies as recorded. All follow-up interviews were tape-recorded and 
documented as a supplement to the scenario interviews recording and field notes, which, 
as a whole, form an integrated portrait of a nurse’s adaptation process. Basic 
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demographic information was also collected, including age, gender, education, working 
experiences, and experiences of using BCMA.  
Data Analysis 
Both scenario interviews and follow-up interviews were transcribed, with 
responses sorted into the following categories: Protocol describes the desired response by 
the nurse to the triggers, represents the practice frame from the perspective of the 
organization. Operational problems are the collision between the triggers (system frame) 
and the protocol (practice frame). Actions of adaptations were what nurses actually 
reported what they would do. The reported actions were fully transcribed, categorized, 
and compared to the protocol.  
The follow-up interviews were analyzed using a content analysis approach. 
Relevant statements were sorted under each step of the Rational Model of Decision 
Making model.  The researcher generated common themes by synthesizing the meaning 
units. Themes reflected a general description of the nurses’ experiences with the BCMA 
operational problems.  
Results 
Sample Characteristics 
Twenty-one nurses were enrolled in the scenario interview and the interviews (n = 
21). Table 4.4 demonstrates that the majority of nurses were younger than 35 years old (n 
= 14, 66.6%), female (n = 20, 95.2%), having a Baccalaureate Degree (n = 16, 76.2), 
working on unit A (n = 12, 57.1%), having less than 5 years working experience (n = 13, 
61.9%), and having been using BCMA over 10 months (n = 21, 100%). 
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Table 4.3  
Characteristics of Sample (N=21) 
Demographics N (%) Demographics N (%) 
Age  Unit  
<25 2 (9.50) A 12 (57.1) 
25-30 8 (38.1) B 1 (4.80) 
30-35 4 (19.0) C 3 (14.3) 
35-40 1 (4.80) D 5 (23.8) 
40-50 6 (28.6) Total 21 (100) 
Total 21 (100) Working Experiences On the Unit  
Gender  <1 Year 1 (4.80) 
Male 1 (4.80) 1-5 Years 12 (57.1) 
Female 20 (95.2) >5 Years  8 (38.1) 
Total  21 (100) Total 21 (100) 
Education  Experiences of Using the BCMA  
Associate Degree 4 (19.0) 17 months (Since July 6, 2014) 19 (90.5) 
Baccalaureate Degree 16 (76.2) 10-17 months 2 (9.50) 
Master’s Degree 1 (4.8) <10 months 0 (0.00) 
Total 21 (100) Total 21 (100) 
 
Reported Actions of Adaptations 
During the scenario interviews, every nurse was given 2 case studies of 
medication administration with 4 scenarios (operational problems) to solve in each case 
(see Table 4.5). Actions reported by the nurses are presented in the table. For each 
scenario, the actions are reported as consistent with the protocol, or not. 
In most scenarios, the actions reported by the majority of the nurses were 
consistent with the recommended protocols. The only exception was scenario C in case 2. 
This suggests that when the system frame collides with the practice frame, most nurses 
tend to follow the protocol. But there still were a considerable of nurses who did not 
follow the protocol and adapted to the operational problems in their ways.  
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Table 4.4 
Reported Actions To the Collision Between the Practice Frame and the Triggers of the System Frame (N = 21) 
Scenarios 
Triggers of the  
System Frame 
Protocol 
Practice Frame 
Operational 
Problems 
Collision 
Reported Actions  N (%) 
Case 1: Patient John Doe, male, 82 years old, admitted 4 days ago, diagnosed with heart failure, pneumonia, type II diabetes, and 
urinary tract infection. Patient is receiving Digoxin® tablets 125 mg po QD, Rocephin® 2g ivpb QD, Penicillin 250 mg po q.8h, and 
Humulin R® 3-6 units SQ PRN with meals, amount based on POC glucose. 
Scenario A: Missing label on 
medication.  
At 8 am, when the nurse 
prepares the medication, she 
finds the label of the par 
stock insulin has run out. 
The nurse should 
contact pharmacy to 
send out a new bottle 
with additional labels 
and discard the 
existing vial. Once the 
new bottle and labels 
arrive, the nurse 
should verify the vial 
and label against the 
order, attach the label 
to the syringe, draw up 
the prescribed dosage 
of the insulin into the 
syringe, put the vial 
back into the fridge, 
and then take the 
syringe to the bedside.  
Although the insulin 
is available, the nurse 
would have to reach 
out to the pharmacist 
and hold the 
medication passing, 
until a new bottle and 
additional labels 
delivered.  
i. The nurse gives the insulin with a 
dosage indicated in the system, but 
without a label on the syringe, and 
overrides the BCMA.  
4 (19.0) 
ii. The nurse waits for labels prior to 
administering dose and uses the current 
vial. 
 
Protocol 
17 (81.0) 
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Scenarios 
Triggers of the  
System Frame 
Protocol 
Practice Frame 
Operational 
Problems 
Collision 
Reported Actions of Adaptation N (%) 
Case 1: Patient John Doe, male, 82 years old, admitted 4 days ago, diagnosed with heart failure, pneumonia, type II diabetes, and 
urinary tract infection. Patient is receiving Digoxin® tablets 125 mg po QD, Rocephin® 2g ivpb QD, Penicillin 250 mg po q.8h, and 
Humulin R® 3-6 units SQ PRN with meals, amount based on POC glucose. 
Scenario B: Oral dosage 
changes prior to order 
verification.  
The physician just orally 
changed the dosage of the 
Digoxin from 125 mg daily 
to 250 mg daily, and it has 
not been verified by the 
pharmacy yet.  
The nurse should hold 
the medication 
administration, wait 
for the pharmacy 
verification. At the 
meantime, the nurse 
could pass all other 
medication. Once the 
new dose is delivered, 
the nurse should 
verify against the 
order and then remove 
it from the Omnicell. 
Since the new order 
has been verified yet, 
so the nurse is unable 
to remove the dose 
from the Omnicell 
without performing 
an override. The 
nurse would have to 
wait for the pharmacy 
verification before 
he/she can perform 
the medication 
administration.   
i. The nurse overrides the new dose, 
removes the medication from the 
Omnicell cabinet, and overrides the 
BCMA. 
2 (9.50) 
ii. The nurse holds the medication 
administration, wait for the pharmacy 
verification. At the meantime, the nurse 
passes all other medication. 
Protocol 
18 (85.7) 
iii. The nurse holds the medication 
administration, and asks the physician 
whether she should wait or give the 
medication, and which dosage should be 
given. 
 
 
1 (4.80) 
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Scenarios 
Triggers of the 
System Frame 
Protocol 
Practice Frame 
Operational 
Problems 
Collision 
Reported Actions of Adaptation N (%) 
Case 1: Patient John Doe, male, 82 years old, admitted 4 days ago, diagnosed with heart failure, pneumonia, type II diabetes, and 
urinary tract infection. Patient is receiving Digoxin® tablets 125 mg po QD, Rocephin® 2g ivpb QD, Penicillin 250 mg po q.8h, and 
Humulin R® 3-6 units SQ PRN with meals, amount based on POC glucose. 
Scenario C: System alert.  
When the nurse scans the vial 
of the antibiotic, an alert 
pops up, and stating “missing 
component”. 
The nurse should 
cancel this action, and 
try to scan the solution 
bag first than scan the 
medication vial. 
The nurse would have 
to cancel the current 
action, and try to scan 
in a different 
sequence, although 
the solution and the 
antibiotic are the 
correct medications.    
i. The nurse overrides the system, and 
continues to scan the solution bag. 
1 (4.80) 
ii. The nurse cancels this action, and tries 
to scan the solution bag first than scans 
the medication vial. 
Protocol 
17 (81.0) 
iii. The nurse contacts the pharmacy to 
update the order. 
3 (14.3) 
Scenario D: Dosage change 
prior to medication delivery.  
The physician just changed 
the dosage of Penicillin from 
250 mg q.8h to 500 mg q.8h, 
but the medication has not 
been delivered yet. 
The nurse should hold 
the administration of 
Penicillin and wait for 
the delivery of the 500 
mg. Once it is 
delivered, the nurse 
should take the 500 
mg to the bedside and 
scan it before deliver 
it. 
The nurse would have 
to wait for the 
delivery of the 500 
mg, although there 
are 2 doses of the 250 
mg available in the 
patient’s medication 
drawer. 
i. The nurse obtains the 2*250 mg 
Penicillin from patient’s medication 
cassette and administers it. When alert 
pops up, she overrides the BCMA. 
1 (4.8) 
ii. The nurse holds the administration of 
Penicillin and waits for the delivery of 
the 500 mg. 
Protocol 
20 (95.2) 
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Scenarios 
Triggers of the  
System Frame 
Protocol 
Practice Frame 
Operational 
Problems 
Collision 
Reported Actions of Adaptation N (%) 
Case 2: Patient Jane Doe, female, 24 years old, admitted 2 days ago, diagnosed with upper respiratory tract infection. Patient is 
receiving Ceclor 500mg PO BID. 
Scenario A: Unfavorable 
environment.  
At 9 pm, when the nurse 
comes to the patient room 
with the medication, she 
finds the patient is resting in 
a chair in front of the 
computer and the room is 
very dark.  
The nurse should ask 
the patient if she could 
turn on the headlight 
briefly for the 
medication pass and 
persuade the patient to 
allow her to access the 
computer. 
The nurse would not 
have enough light to 
verify the 
medications against 
the order. He/she also 
would not able to 
reach the computer to 
access the order or 
the BCMA.   
i. The nurse gives the medication without 
turning the light on and documents the 
administration outside of the room. 
5 (23.8) 
ii. The nurse persuades the patient to allow 
her to access the computer and turn on 
the light. 
Protocol 
16 (76.2) 
Scenario B: Backstage 
glitches.  
Order and label both match, 
but a computer alert indicates 
no active order. 
Nurse should hold the 
medication delivery 
and contact the 
pharmacy to 
understand why 
medication label is not 
scanning when active 
order and label match. 
The pharmacy should 
be able to fix the 
backstage glitch. 
The nurse may be 
confused when active 
order and label match 
but the medication 
can’t be scanned. 
He/she could either 
verify with the 
physician to see if the 
order has been 
deactivated, or ask 
the pharmacy to see 
how to proceed. 
i. Nurse administers the medication as 
ordered and overrides the BCMA. 
5 (23.8) 
ii. Nurse contacts pharmacy to understand 
why medication label is not scanning 
when active order and label match. 
Protocol 
10 (47.6) 
iii. Nurse contacts pharmacy for a new 
dose. 
1 (4.8) 
iv. Nurse contacts physician for 
verification. 
5 (23.8) 
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Scenarios 
Triggers of the 
System Frame 
Protocol 
Practice Frame 
Operational 
Problems 
Collision 
Reported Actions of Adaptation N (%) 
Case 2: Patient Jane Doe, female, 24 years old, admitted 2 days ago, diagnosed with upper respiratory tract infection. Patient is 
receiving Ceclor 500mg PO BID. 
Scenario C: Medication 
administration interruption.  
The nurse is in the patient’s 
room passing the medication, 
while in the process of 
scanning the medication the 
physician comes in to speak 
with the nurse about the 
patient. 
The nurse should tell 
the physician he/she is 
in the middle of 
administering these 
patient medications 
and will come out and 
speak with them when 
he/she is finished with 
this task. 
The nurse may be 
interrupted or 
distracted in the 
middle of medication 
administration by 
healthcare providers 
or patient families.  
i. The nurse stops the medication 
administration to speak with the 
physician. 
 
11 (52.4) 
ii. The nurse tells the physician he/she is in 
the middle of administering these 
patient medications and will come out 
and speak with them when he/she is 
finished with this task. 
 
Protocol 
9 (42.9) 
iii. The nurse talks with the physician and 
continues to administer the patient 
medications. 
 
 
1 (4.8) 
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Scenarios 
Triggers of the 
System Frame 
Protocol 
Practice Frame 
Operational 
Problems 
Collision 
Reported Actions of Adaptation N (%) 
Case 2: Patient Jane Doe, female, 24 years old, admitted 2 days ago, diagnosed with upper respiratory tract infection. Patient is 
receiving Ceclor 500mg PO BID. 
Scenario D: Missing 
wristband. 
The patient wristband is 
found on the bedside table 
and not affixed to the patient. 
The nurse should ask 
the patient the name 
and DOB to verify the 
identity of the patient, 
and affix the 
wristband back to the 
patient. Or, he/she 
could go to the clerk, 
print a new wristband, 
and affix to the patient 
after performing 
identification 
verification, and then, 
administer 
medications. 
The nurse probably 
would assume this is 
the same patient 
indicated on the 
wristband, so he/she 
probably would not 
take further action to 
verify identification 
before affix the 
wristband back to the 
patient. 
i. The nurse asks the patient to put on the 
wristband without asking patient’s DOB 
and scans it. 
4 (19.0) 
ii. The nurse asks the patient patient’s 
name and DOB to verify the identity of 
the patient, and affix the wristband back 
to the patient. 
 
Protocol 
9 (42.9) 
iii. The nurse goes to the clerk, prints a new 
wristband, and affix to the patient just 
prior to administering meds. Performing 
identification verification prior to 
affixing the wristband. 
 
Protocol 
8 (38.1) 
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Within the 21 scenario interviews, nurses suggested pharmacists would be called for help 
in addressing 9 of the operational problems (42.9%). Physicians would be involved in addressing 
4 operational problems (19.0%), while pharmacist and physicians were both engaged in 
addressing 8 operational problems (38.1%). None of the operational problems could be 
accomplished by the nurses themselves alone.  
Follow Up Interviews 
Qualitative data analysis is summarized along the steps of rational judgment, with several 
themes emerged under them (see Table 4.6): 1) identifying operational problems, 2) identifying 
ultimate goal, 3) determining situation, 4) strategies for adaptation, and 5) consequences of the 
alternative actions. Examples from multiple selected transcripts are presented go demonstrate 
these themes.  
1. Identifying Operational Problems 
In the follow-up interviews, nurses verified that the operational problems delineated in 
the scenarios happed frequently in their daily work situations. They described that these 
operational problems happened every single day and were the issues that bothered their delivery 
of care in an efficient and safe way.  
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Table 4.5 
Themes Emerged From the Qualitative Interviews 
Steps of  
Rational Model of Decision Making 
Themes 
1. Identifying Operational Problems 
1) Operational problems triggered by technology 
2) Operational problems triggered by task  
3) Operational problems triggered by environment  
4) Operational problems triggered by person  
5) Operational problems triggered by organization 
2. Identifying Ultimate Goal 
1) Safety 
2) Accuracy 
3. Determining Situation 
1) Medication characteristics 
2) Patient situation 
4. Strategies for Adaptation 
1) Jump-in 
2) Skip and come back 
3) Equalize 
4) Be proactive 
5) Override upon scrutiny 
6) Communicate patiently 
7) Collaborate with other disciplines 
5. Consequences of the Alternative 
Actions 
1) Sabotage patient safety 
2) Delay of care 
3) Dissatisfy patient 
 
Besides the difficulties portrayed within the scenarios, nurses also provided other 
examples that were similar to examples in the scenario interview. These operational problems 
could be triggered by task, which involves medication and barcodes, technology, i.e., technology 
difficulties, environment, which could be limited space or distractions/interruptions, organization, 
which primarily refers to the delays resulted by the pharmacy.  
“Whenever pharmacy sends us multiple dose vials, they never send us stickers, like 
labetalol. They always send you one packet of stickers, and that’s not enough.” 
 
“I mean things like that have happened where you have the right medication and 
everything and you don’t have an active order and you’re like, ‘wait what happened?’ The 
doctor said to give this, and so I have it. It’s usually just a matter of like, they’re in the computer 
tinkering around with it so you need to wait for it to actually be an active order and you need to 
wait for the pharmacy to verify it so. I feel like all those are real life situations that happen 
frequently.” 
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“I feel like we get interrupted a lot during our med pass times. Whether or not it is 
respiratory therapy, or physical therapy, that they wouldn’t even acknowledge that we’re in the 
middle of passing medications. They might start talking to the patient. One time, respiratory 
therapist just out of habit I think, like logging me off the computer during the middle of my med 
pass. So I feel like the interruptions is a major thing.” 
 
“The problem with pharmacy is we are the last stop on their run. So sometimes it’s like 
the doc might come in and write an order for something. They may put in an order at let’s say 
10:30. They send their run out at 10:30. So if we don’t go get it, we’re not going to get it until 
noon. And depending on what the drug is, you can’t wait.” 
 
The operational problems they delivered in the interviews verified the results of the 
literature review, the observation and the interviews conducted beforehand, which proves that 
BCMA-related operational problems do exist within the process of medication administration 
and impede nurses from strictly following the established protocol.  
2. Identifying Ultimate Goal 
After the nurses identifying the operational problems when they were trying to 
accomplish the medication administration, they then realized they had to pause their performance 
and thought about the ultimate goal before they could make the next move.  
Safety. The majority of the nurses set patient safety as their priority at that moment, 
which was also the ultimate goal of what they were trying to accomplish. When they could not 
strictly follow the protocol with the operational problems kept in the middle of the way, they 
aimed to deliver the right medication to the right patient, at the right time, in the right way, with 
the right dosage. 
“For the most part, I just want to make sure that I give my patients the meds they need, I 
give them the correct meds, and obviously that they’re safe, and I’m doing as ordered to do. If I 
ever have a question, I’ll page the doctor, or the pharmacy, just to clarify if something doesn’t 
sound right. A lot of times, if I’m reading off the medication I’m giving, and the patients are like 
“I don’t take that” or “why am I on that?” and then I’ll page the doctor just to have them 
explain to me why they’re on that or prescribed that. Sometimes, you’ve caught meds that 
shouldn’t be given that way.” 
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“It’s definitely hard because nursing is a balance. You want to be able to get things done 
so you’re not dilly-dallying. But you obviously need to be able to do that, but at the same time, I 
mean the goal should be patient safety and making sure that we’re keeping the patient safe 
regardless. I mean computers are computers. Technology is not always 100%, so when 
something fails, we need to rely on ourselves to make sure we’re providing the best care possible 
and promoting safety. And yeah, it might take ten more minutes but it could be someone’s life in 
the end so.” 
 
When operational problems happen, these nurses often consult with another nurse, or 
even other disciplines, to verify the “5 right”. It not only requires critical thinking, clinical 
judgment, but also collaboration to adapt to those problems.  
Accuracy.  Besides safety concerns, several nurses also worry about the accuracy of their 
performance adjustment. When the path the nurses took had to deviate from the normal way, 
they wanted to make sure that it was still accurate and would not interfere with the future care.  
“Make sure it is accurate, and it is all recorded because that is how people can look up if 
they last took it a certain time, so just accuracy and safety.” 
 
“I want to complete my tasks on time because I don’t want to just sit around, and wait 
two hours for something to come from pharmacy. That’s why I will always call them and make 
sure that ‘are you guys making this? Did you see the change?’” 
 
The nurses set a clear goal in their mind, when they encountered the operational problems, 
if they probably could not accomplish the tasks in an ideal way. This goal would enlighten their 
action plan for the next step. Guided by the ultimate goal, the nurses then gathered the 
information and analyzed the situation, followed by a decision made on the next move.  
3. Determining situation 
When facing operational problems, nurses were exposed in a complicated situation with a 
number of factors entangled with each other. The nurses would have to gather data and 
information and apply their knowledge, experiences, and critical thinking to make a clinical 
judgment about the patient’s conditions, and then to decide the next move they should take by 
determining the current situation.  
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Medication Characteristics. When they came across the problem that the medication 
was not delivered at the time medication was due, or the dosage was changed before the 
pharmacy verified, some nurses would take the characteristics of the medications they were 
delivering into consideration to determine if the medication could or not wait to be delivered.  
“Depending on what the medication is, some of them are more critical than others. Like 
if it’s 9 AM and it’s a multivitamin and stool softener, and they only take once a day, I can wait 
until noon on those meds.” 
 
“Um, well, I guess I would go ahead and probably just give it that way the patient gets 
the medication when they need it, instead of having to wait for the pharmacy to send a new 
tablet. I am going to want to give it to the patient as soon as possible, especially if it, depending 
on the medication, if it is a blood pressure medication or something like that, I want to give it to 
the patient in a timely manner.” 
 
Patient situation. Some other nurses, on the other hand, would consider patient’s 
situation as a more critical factor, when they determined if they should wait for the pharmacy to 
deliver the medication by tubing or on their next trip, instead of taking alternative actions 
themselves, such as overriding the BCMA, picking up the medications themselves, or delivering 
the same medication but with different, equalized doses.  
“If that was a regular scheduled medication, the patient was in no obvious distress, and 
an oral medication would take an hour to work anyways, I’m less concerned with the patient’s 
need for an on-time medication. I would wait for pharmacy to deliver the meds. I will not 
override the system. I am more concerned with safety and making sure that it’s recorded 
properly.” 
 
“For instance with the insulin, I know that’s what they need. Yes, I could wait for more 
labels. If the blood sugar was high, I would give the medication, but I would bring the vial with 
me, and I would check it and make sure that this is what they’re getting. In that situation, I would 
override it because that’s what they needed. But for other things like their antibiotic dose 
doubled or something like, I would wait for that, because half an hour, an hour, is not going to 
make a big difference for that.” 
 
“So, by waiting for the pharmacist to make sure that it was correct and that it was 
verified, the patient is now waiting, so I mean there could be some potential consequences there. 
So that is where it is always making sure that they are safe. So obviously, any point in time if 
they seem like they were deteriorating, then I might have made a different decision. But if it 
seems like they are completely stable, and it is just a simple waiting for the verification, then I 
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think, I made the right choice by choosing what I did. But if they started to deteriorate, then I 
would do something different in that moment.” 
 
 “It’s a med they’ve already been given, and I know they’re not going to react to that 
medication. If I have the dose that I need in a different form I have given, if they really need that 
medicine because their heart rate’s sky high or something like that, I’ll usually ask the doctor for 
permission. I’ll say, “I have these two tablets. They equal whatever dose. Do I have to wait or 
can I give this?” and they usually give it, “it’s fine”. I’ll just write, “okay per MD” in the 
comment.” 
 
Nurses collected the information, analyzed the situation, and then made the decision by 
balancing patient safety, their comfortableness, and work efficiency. This process costs their 
knowledge, professional skills, and clinical experiences. Different people may see situation 
differently, but in the end, the skill sets they get from their experience will lead them to make the 
right decision to the best of their knowledge.    
4. Strategies for Adaptation 
To accomplish their ultimate goal, the nurses developed their own strategies to adapt to 
the operational problems, after they analyzed the situation with the information they gathered on 
site. These strategies are appropriate or effective with some operational problems, but may not be 
appropriate or effective with other operational problems.  
Jump-In. When the nurses had the operational problem that the medication was not 
delivered yet, the majority of the nurses chose to jump in and execute immediately.  
“I would say, just to get the medications here in a timely manner, whether it be me going 
up to pharmacy or asking if somebody else can go up to pharmacy, calling them either to get 
them verified, so I can pull it out of the Omnicell, or just running up there to get the actual 
physical medication.” 
 
“We spend a lot of time going upstairs to pharmacy to get things because we don’t want 
to wait for stuff to be delivered, because it can take a considerable amount of time. We have to 
leave all the patients, and somebody else has to keep an eye out for our patients. We have to 
leave the floor. It’s just an additional step; it takes a lot of time out of our day if I have to do it. 
So that’s the biggest problem with that.” 
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Skip and come back. When the nurses had an uncooperative patient, or the patient was 
in rest/sleep, when they were trying to deliver medications, one nurse described that she would 
skip that patient and come back later at a better timing.  
“Cause I can usually work around the patient. Sometimes if they’re sleeping or 
something, and I have 3 sets of people to give meds to, I’ll leave that one and go to the next 
person. Sometimes by the time you get back to them, they’re awake, and they’re more 
cooperative and more willing to let you do what you need to do.” 
 
Equalize. Nurses are not autonomous on dosage adjustment of medications. But when 
bigger dosage had not been delivered yet, some nurses matched the smaller ones to the bigger 
one to ensure the medication would be passed in a timely manner. 
“Digoxin is in the Omnicell, the smaller dose. So what you could do is just take two small 
pills and scan them to make the big dose. That’s probably what I would do. Cause if I’m already 
giving them pills, and they have a hard time swallowing or I have to crush them, I’m going to 
cluster my care. I’m not going to wait for that new dose to be delivered. Cause you’re not 
bothering the patient as much and it’s clustering care. On this unit, you give so many meds and 
there’s so much going on. Each patient might have like 20 something meds just at 9 AM. Yeah. 
And you have your noon’s, your 2’s, your 5’s, and your 6’s.”  
 
Be proactive. Some nurses mentioned that as a nurse, they needed to act proactively, 
especially when physicians modified orders in the system. They would notify pharmacy right 
after the order had been adjusted, instead of waiting for the pharmacy to verify the order in hours.  
“You need to be proactive and call pharmacy. Say “hey they’ve changed this dose, um, 
can I use the ones that I have the one on the floor or can you send me one as soon as you can? 
Can you prepare it for me?” Like I said, pharmacy’s always been great, getting me meds as soon 
as they can.” 
 
Override upon scrutiny. The nurses viewed override in different ways. Some of them 
expressed that they would rather not to override the system whenever they had an operational 
problem, as they believed overriding the alert would endanger patient safety. However, other 
nurses relied more on their own visual check, when they viewed delivering medication as it was 
scheduled equally important as patient safety is.    
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“I have had it happen a few times, when the barcode won’t scan, when I know I have the 
right medication. I have the med in my hand, and I am checking the order. I know it is the right 
medication, right patient, and the barcode just won’t scan, whether it is because the barcode is 
ripped or it’s water damaged or sometimes. The barcode looks perfect, but it just won’t scan. I 
think that is usually when I end up overriding, because I know I have the right medication. I 
know it’s appropriate for the patient. Especially if it is something more time sensitive, like an 
antibiotic or a pain med, where the delay of me getting the pharmacist to send me a new barcode 
or new one of the medication, just seems completely unnecessary.” 
 
“I override like every shift at least once. I know some nurses don’t do that, but I’m not 
going to let my nursing care suffer because of technical difficulties. I think as long as you’re not 
relying on just the barcoding for everything to be accurate, and you still looking at the package 
and looking at everything, even with the barcoding working perfectly, I think you’re not 
necessarily going to run into safety issues.” 
 
Communicate patiently. In a work system, multiple disciplines play roles in the process 
of medication administration, as well as patients and their families. To make the work system 
function effectively, nurses are unavoidably required to communicate with different parties. 
Interruptions coming from either patients or physicians were impeding the nurses to deliver 
medications in a safe and efficient way. The majority of them were able to negotiate with 
physicians, but a few admitted that in the real life, they would probably let the physician finish 
their talking before they could proceed with their medication administration.  
“I have had times like where patients are not or refusing to wear the wristband for 
whatever reason and taking the time to have that conversation with them, why it is important that 
they wear it. Also, if a doctor interrupts me while I am passing medications, have that 
conversation with them. Once you tell people it is for safety, they get it. I think a lot of times we, 
in health care, have so many things going on in our heads and a million different to do lists, that 
we kind of skip over the easy explanations to our patients. So they just think they are being told 
to do something, but don’t understand the reason.” 
 
Collaborate with other disciplines. To accomplish medication administration, when 
there was an operational problem, nurses would have to collaborate with other disciplines. It is 
noticeable that nurses expressed they would always go to the advanced practice team or the 
pharmacists first when they had a medication issue. Physicians would be their last stop, if the 
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other two disciplines could not help, because physicians were probably too busy to be able to 
help.  
“We have a pretty good rapport with our advance practice team, who is the one writing 
our orders. So I feel comfortable to go in and talk to them, if I have a question about a med.” 
 
“I think a lot of times with any type of barcode error or scanning error, your first instinct 
is to go to pharmacy. However there are certain instances where you need to let the physician 
know, so that they can reorder the medication. I feel like physicians are pretty distant from this 
issue. Because it’s like they just want to make sure the meds are being given. It’s probably a little 
more difficult for them to understand our frustration with it or our issues. So pharmacy first and 
foremost is probably your best choice. They can help with ensuring that you can scan 
appropriately and how to resolve issues if there’s any.” 
 
When operational problems happened, the nurses came up with different strategies to 
adapt to the correspondent problems. No matter what strategies the nurses chose to apply, they 
were generally created by a good intention, ample experiences, cautious analysis, and 
appropriate judgment. Behind diverse coping strategies, patient safety is always put as the 
priority by the nurses.   
5. Consequences of the Alternative Actions 
When the nurses had strategies in their mind to address the operational problems, they 
also described the consequences of the alternative actions to approve their strategies were the 
most appropriate. They believed if they did not do the way that they performed, they could 
sabotage patient safety, delay the nursing care, or dissatisfy patients.  
“I mean there could be minor to major consequences. You could give a wrong 
medication, you could give the wrong dose, or you could give it to the wrong patient. You could 
end up killing someone and not even mean to because you didn’t critically think. I mean 
obviously those are very serious questions.”  
 
“If I didn’t wait, there could be a drug interaction. It could not be safe for the patient, so 
I am always waiting for verification. I always want to make sure the pharmacy verifies it first, 
because there could be several reasons why they don’t okay it. Because that is why we go 
through the pharmacy first is to make sure it is safe for the patient. Make sure there isn’t any 
other drug interaction. There are other people that you work with that can see that you’re doing 
that, and that’s not promoting the best practice. You eventually end up getting in trouble for not 
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following protocol. I always think it is worth the hassle to go and do the extra step even if it’s not 
something my patient or someone else thinks is right.”  
 
“Just like delay of care. I mean especially with time sensitive medications, with 
antibiotics, you want to try to stay as closely on schedule as you can. If that gets messed up, that 
throws it all off. So that is an issue, same with like a pain medication, and that could lead to the 
patient getting upset, because they feel like you are not giving them the care they want. If the 
pharmacists are really busy doing something else, and then they might take longer than the hour, 
which could be an issue. So that is why it would be necessary to call them and have a discussion 
with them, and why you need it verified sooner than some of the other meds that are on their to 
do list.”  
 
“I would be backed up on my work probably. Patients probably would not be very happy, 
because they’d be waiting and waiting. For instance if I didn’t give the other meds and just held 
that one med that I didn’t get yet, the patient would probably think I’m ignoring them. They’d 
probably think, “Well, why am I not getting my other meds? I know this dose changed but…” 
They feel like you’re not taking care of them if you’re not showing up and being active in there. 
So if it’s just one pill I’m waiting for, I can give them all their other pills and come back for that 
other one.” 
 
The nurses described that patient safety and how patient would feel about their 
performance were critical for them when they were dealing with the scenarios. With that priority 
in their minds, although operational problems happen, patients will not be jeopardized when the 
problems hinder nurses from delivering medications in the way as they were ordered.  
Discussion 
The findings indicate that in hypothetical, scenario-based practice examples, the practice 
frame collides with the system frame, which leads to a series of operational problems, requiring 
adaptation from the nurses’ end. The operational problems identified by the nurses of this study 
were consistent with the existing literature. For example, the medication order was not in the 
system when nurse scan the medication by the time it was due because of backstage glitches, 
which required the nurse to discover the source of the barricade. Ross Koppel et al. [30] described 
the similar finding in their work, but in a different way, i.e., it’s the consequence of a stat, verbal, 
or not yet entered order. The physical environment was not always favorable for nurses to 
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perform the medication administration, which was always reported in the literature [10, 30]. The 
“tenacity” of the system was shown in cases such as when nurses were not autonomous 
regarding adjusting doses of medications was reported in precious literature [14, 31]. An 
operational problem rarely occurred as an independent event with singular cause; it was more 
likely to be associated with multiple components of the work system [30, 32, 33]. Nurse leadership 
must take the collective impact of these components into consideration, in order to make sure the 
policies, workflow, and processes and structures are consistent with best practice and meet the 
demands of bedside nurse practice [34].  
The strategies nurses came up with in this study, when encountering medication 
administration operational problems were partially reported in the literature. In this study, nurses 
were reported that they would first contact with the pharmacy or the advanced nursing service 
before they had to reach out to the physicians [35, 36]. This pattern of behavior could introduce 
new paths to adverse events, in terms of failing to detect automatically renewed or discontinued 
medication orders [35]. Some literature reported that when goal conflict, timeliness of medication 
administration was the priority set by the nurses because they were concerned about the analyses 
of timeliness of medication administration and the stigma of late doses automatically 
documented in the system [14, 35]. However, in this study, the timeliness of medication 
administration is less prioritized than patient safety, when nurses determine the ultimate goal 
during goal conflicts. Nurses describe their work in holistic terms. They examine medication 
management amid various clinical and logistic dependencies, such as patient comfortableness, 
their trips off the floor for test and therapies, and patient’s needs for sleep and rest [14].   
The results of this study have a couple of implications for system redesign. Nurses 
reported the characteristics of the medications they were delivering and patient situations were 
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crucial factors determining their strategies of adaptation. Other literature also described that 
nurses placed transplant patients at a high priority for on-time administrations, in terms of paying 
special attention to the deliver of antibiotics and drawing at peak and trout blood levels of the 
drugs. Other medications, which were of lower priority, could be delayed as a result of patient’s 
resting, such as Tylenol or stool softener [14]. While the traditional classification of medication 
was the active ingredients, the characteristics of medication and patient situation could be 
introduced into decision support of the BCMA. For example, after nurse collect patient’s blood 
pressure before delivering the Digoxin, the BCMA could indicate the nurse if the Digoxin is 
needed to be given immediately or not. So when the Digoxin delays to be delivered or is missing 
on the unit, the nurse can determine if he/she needs to take actions at this moment, either go pick 
it up or borrow from other patients. The personal-level of decision support should address both 
the characteristics of the medication and patent situation to collectively analyze the necessity of a 
specific medication and provide the nurses with the correct suggestions of the next move.  
In this study, it was noteworthy that some nurses were more inclined to override the 
BCMA than other nurses. They reported that as long as they conducted the visual check and 
followed the protocol, they were confident to override the BCMA and proceed with the 
medication administration, when an alert popped up. In addition to that, some nurses would take 
a series of actions to understand the nature of an operational problem, while others only reached 
out to the pharmacy, when there was an alert indicating no active order in the system after a 
medication was scanned. This type of behavioral pattern could be included in the continuous and 
iterative assessment of nurses’ interaction with the computer system [37] and operational failure 
that impede task accomplishment [38] to provide personalized support according to various 
characteristics of nurses. For example, for those nurses who frequently overrided the BCMA, the 
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system may automatically reduce the frequency of the alerts of the performance they didn't 
usually override, but increase the frequency of the alerts of the performance they often override, 
in order to decrease their level of the comfortableness of overriding. This type of analysis and 
audit should also be delivered by the technical support from health IT professionals. 
There are several limitations to this study that limit he generalization of findings. There 
were only one hospital’s 4 units recruited in the study. The findings from this study could be 
hard to generalize to other sites with different type of medical services, patient population, and 
BCMA system. The scenarios may not able to cover all the types of operational problems nurses 
usually encounter in real nursing practice. Finally, only the investigator analyzed the qualitative 
data, and the identification of themes was not confirmed with study nurses.  
Conclusion 
This study presented an initial but crucial step to understand the adaptation to the 
operational problems of BCMA, taking the various components of the work system into 
consideration when understanding nurses’ adaptive behavior to the operational problems of a 
new health IT. Different nurses would respond differently when they are facing the same 
operational problems of BCMA, which requires us to view the process of adaptation within a 
context of the work system. By understanding the pattern and rationale of the adaptive behaviors 
of nurses to the operational problems of BCMA, it is helpful for us to improve the quality of care 
by optimizing the work processes, workloads, training and education, and policies. Given the 
fact that the operational problems of BCMA are unavoidable, it is critical to understand how 
nurses can better adapt to them before they endanger patient safety. This research provides 
suggested paths to reveal the nature of the adaptive process, when BCMA operational problems 
occur.   
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Chapter V 
Conclusion 
The specific aims of the study were to: 1) conduct an integrative literature review about 
operational problems of BCMA, 2) validate a typology of operational problems of BCAM 
yielded in the integrative literature review, and 3) assess nurses’ adaptations to BCMA 
operational problems and describe their perceptions about the adaptations.  This dissertation adds 
to the growing knowledge base of the understanding of BCMA operational problems and nurses’ 
adaptations. This chapter provides a summary of the findings, strengths and limitations of the 
study, and implications for future research and nursing practice.  
In chapter one, a conceptual framework guiding this dissertation was described.  From a 
sociotechnical perspective, operational problems are the occurrences that are perceived to make 
goal accomplishment difficult, unsatisfying, or impossible in accordance with standards or 
protocol for timely and effective performance [1]. When operational problems occur in the 
BCMA process, nurses are respond to the perceived problems in order to accomplish some pre-
established goal relative to standards for timely and effective performance; this process is known 
as “adaptations” [1]. Based on the literature, a conceptual framework was developed to describe 
the relationship between the “system frame”, “practice frame”, collisions between the system 
frame and practice frame that cause operational problems, and adaptations to operational 
problems (see Figure 5.1). “System frame” describes the functionality or implementation of a 
system as the representative of the cumulative resources within a system to operate and problem-
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solve [2]. In this framework, the five factors of the SEIPS work system compose the system frame, 
and often are triggers for the collisions that occur between system frames and practice frames.  
The “practice frame” is an aggregation of the bedside nurses’ perspectives gained through 
observations and interviews [2]. In the context of medication administration practice, practice 
frame is represented as the standards and protocols, which known as the “5Rs” (right patient, 
right medication, right time, right dose, and right route), safety and efficiency. When the “system 
frame” can’t meet the needs of the “practice frame”, the two frames collide, and operational 
problems occur, which require nurses to adapt.  
 
Figure 5.1. BCMA and adaptation.  
However, efforts to understand BCMA’s impact on nursing work have primarily 
concentrated on workarounds [1-17], which is a type of adaptation [2]. Workarounds are defined as 
“informal temporary practices for handling exceptions to normal workflow” [8], or “staff 
deviation actions that do not follow explicit or implicit rules, assumptions, workflow regulations, 
or intentions of system designers” [18]. In contrast to “adaptations” which emphasize goal-
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oriented behaviors, the “workarounds” literature emphasizes behaviors as a consequence of the 
processes within a work system. Furthermore, “adaptation” emphasizes the process of 
operational problem solving as a dynamic process, in which the communication between nurses 
and the environment has the potential to inform pathways to design or redesign the work system.  
Workarounds are often studied under the assumption that workarounds are inherently dangerous 
and a threat to patient safety [9, 19-21]; whereas, adaptations are beneficial attempts, reflecting the 
reactions and decisions in difficult situations. It has been noted that some of today’s best 
practices were yesterday’s adaptations; some of today’s adaptations could also be tomorrow’s 
best practices [22].  
In chapter two, an integrative literature review was conducted to summarize the existing 
state of knowledge about the triggers of the operational problems of BCMA. The main findings 
of a review of 12 publications were: 1) the triggers of the operational problems of BCMA 
reported in the selected literature can be sorted into the 5 categories of the SEIPS model (person, 
technology, environment, organization, and tasks), 2) operational problems triggered in 
medication administration practice are not only a result of imperfect design of hardware and 
software, but also derived from the barriers developed by how the technology is used and 
responded to by its users, 3) across the 5 categories of triggers to the operational problems, we 
noted that each category does not exist exclusively; and 4) the medication administration practice 
is viewed by nurses in a holistic way, rather than being unique “5Rs”.  
Chapter three validated the findings of operational problems of BCMA yielded in the 
integrative literature review in Chapter two. The study used a combined research method that 
involved on-site observations of medication administration and follow-up semi-structured 
interviews to better unveil the triggers to the operational problems of BCMA that nurses are 
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currently facing or anticipate may occur. First, there were 43 medication administration events 
conducted by the 22 nurses on 4 medical/surgical units.  
Major findings gained through the on-site observations are reported as follows. The 
computer keyboard, instead of the patient table, was the most frequent surface (n = 28, 65.1%) 
used by the nurses to organize the medications. Most of the nurses used the overhead lighting to 
deliver medications (n = 27, 62.8%). The majority of the nurses hit objects (n = 31, 72.1%) or 
stretched the cord over the patients (n = 11, 25.6%) when delivering medications. Other 
disciplines (i.e., physicians and pharmacists), besides nurses, were always involved in the 
medication administration (n = 34, 79.1%). 
During the follow-up interviews, the nurses described that they could deliver medications 
in a safer and more efficient way by using BCMA, but they also felt more stressful in the manner 
of adding more steps. A number of nurses noticed they were overdependent on the BCMA, 
without critical thinking about the necessity of a medication to a patient. The cord issues, system 
backstage glitches, and system delays or shutdown were identified by the nurses as the 
operational problems triggered by the technology itself. Missing or dysfunctional medication 
barcode and wristband barcode were the nurses’ biggest concerns related to the tasks the nurses 
had. It was reported that the system’s “tenacity” did not allow the nurses to adjust the time of the 
medication delivery or the dose of the medications. There was always limited space on the 
platform and in the patient room, which was the most frequently reported operational problem 
caused by the environment. Patients under special conditions (i.e. emergency or isolation) were 
perceived by the nurses as barriers for delivering medications in an efficient way. Nurses 
portrayed that pharmacy could delay the verification and delivery of the medications after 
physicians prescribe them in the EHR. The results described above mostly validated the findings 
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of the literature review. The trigger of the operational problems of BCMA fell into the five 
components of the work system [23]. The majority of the operational problems reported in this 
study were also described in the literature.  
Chapter four explored patterns of how nurses responded to the operational problems of 
BCMA and their perceptions about the adaptive behaviors they conducted. To better understand 
the process of adaptation, a prospective, exploratory research design was utilized, including both 
scenario-based interviews and follow-up interviews. The scenarios were developed using the 
triggers to the operational problems of BCMA synthesized and validated in the first two studies. 
During the scenario interviews, all of the 22 nurses completed 2 cases with 4 scenarios (i.e., 
operational problems) of medication administration.  
It demonstrated in the scenario interviews that overall, across the scenarios, the majority 
responses to the scenarios were consistent with the practice protocol. This finding suggests that 
when the system frame collides with the practice frame, most nurses tend to follow the protocol. 
But there is still a number of nurses who adapt their behaviors to the operational problems in 
different ways.  
In the follow-up interviews, the nurses explained the rationale for their adaptive 
behaviors. Firstly, the nurses verified that the scenarios described during the interviews did 
happen frequently in their daily practice and intervene with the safe and efficient nursing care. 
After identifying the operational problems, most nurses set patient safety as their priority, when 
they were having the operational problems. Then, nurses made a clinical judgment about the 
patient’s conditions to determine the next move they should take. Factors affecting their 
decision-making were medication characteristics and patient situation. Following that, to 
accomplish their goals, nurses developed their own strategies to adapt to the operational 
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problems. When the medication was not delivered yet, the majority of the nurses would jump in 
immediately, in terms of picking up the medication themselves. If the patient was not ready for 
medication administration, nurses skipped that patient and came back to that patient later. If the 
bigger dose of a medication had not been delivered yet, some nurses picked the smaller doses to 
match the bigger dose to make sure they would be administered on time. A number of the nurses 
reported they would be proactive, when physician adjusted orders, by notifying pharmacy to 
verify the updated orders. Although the majority of the nurses expressed that they would try not 
to override the system for safety issues, some nurses would rather override the system with a 
visual check to deliver the medication in a timely manner. Generally, the nurses stated that 
physicians’ interruptions during medication administration could be eliminated, if they 
communicated patiently. It was noteworthy that nurses showed their willingness of collaborating 
with the advanced practice team or the pharmacists over the physicians, if they had a medication 
problem. Finally, nurses evaluated the consequences of the alternative actions. They believed 
that, if they did not adapt to the operational problems, they could put patient in danger, delay the 
medication delivery, or dissatisfy patients.  
Overall, a key contribution of this dissertation research is the indication that the 
conceptual framework provides a new way to examine the nature of the operational problems of 
BCMA and the adaptations to those problems.  This one of the first studies that investigated 
nurses’ perceptions about their adaptation process when operational problems of BCMA 
occurred. 
Limitations 
Limitations of the study are recognized.  Overall limitation of this dissertation study is 
that there is only one rater across all three studies. The inter-rater reliability of the findings is not 
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established. Different reviewers may have classified the results of the literature and observations 
differently.  
One of the limitations of the study reported in Chapter 4 is that scenarios were delivered 
as interviews, not actual observations of adaptations. A combined qualitative research method 
with on-site observations and interviews was recommended in the literature to better understand 
the full-scale of the phenomenon [9, 24-30]. Direct observation with patients in the natural 
environment can better imply the need for process and technology redesign [27].  
Implications for Clinical Practice 
This dissertation study demonstrated that operational problems of BCMA prevalently 
occurred during medication administration practice. The triggers of the operational problems 
could be categorized into the five elements of the SEIPS work system. An operational problem 
was more like to be caused by several triggers, which are contributed by upstream and 
downstream glitches [9, 31]. The scenarios designed in Chapter IV showed that an operational 
problem could be triggered by multiple elements of the SEIPS work system. This finding could 
help leadership and management to consider the collective causes and sources of the operational 
problems to ensure that BCMA policies, processes, and protocols are consistent with best 
practice and the demands of bedside nursing care [31]. Operational problems may be able to be 
mitigated by controlling and adjusting the triggers of the system frame. The recommended 
practice protocol of the practice frame may evolve over time by learning from nurses’ 
adaptations. The process of nurses’ adaptations is a dynamic process; the adaptations affect the 
adjustment of the triggers of the system frame and the protocols of the practice frame.  
The triggers of the operational problems of BCMA reported by the nurses in Chapter III 
may provide system designers and developers with evidence of opportunities for improvement. 
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The majority of the participating nurses reported issues with cord between the hand scanner and 
the computer.  A cordless scanner with a reset button could dramatically facilitate the medication 
administration process, especially when the patient is away from the computer with objects in the 
way, and the barcode on patient’s wristband is hard to scan; nurses would not have to make 
multiple trips between the computer and the patient, when the cord does not easily stretch over 
the patient and other objects.  
Given that adaptation is understudied, it is very possible to label adaptation as 
undesirable side effects committed by “resistors” or  “bad apples” [2, 32]. Actually, adaptations are 
probably unavoidable and necessary to accomplish the pre-established goals of safe medication 
administration [1]. Adaptations could be tomorrow’s “best practice” and consequently, be 
promoted and facilitated [1]. Sometimes, nurses attempt to adjust the dosage of medication and 
the time of administration for good reasons.  For example, when the schedule of a regular sleep 
medication needs to be staggered after a surgical procedure, or a nurse wants to administer two 
smaller doses of an antibiotic after the bigger dose has not been delivered for an hour. The 
system design and practice protocol should allow nurses to make that adjustment by 
documenting a comment, instead of stamping a “late dose” or “wrong dosage” in the system. 
Management and leadership could take several actions to remove the stigma of some adaptations 
that actually promote safe and timely medication administration [2].   
Directions for Future Research 
Future research should more rigorously investigate nurses’ adaptive behaviors to 
operational problems. Client simulation has been used extensively in studies for clinical problem 
solving because it allows researchers to mimic the clinical environment while controlling for 
other variables possibly existing in real-life situations [33, 34]. High fidelity simulation is 
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considered especially useful for identifying variations in workflows that are rooted in 
implementation of a new system, and then predicting potential use problems and errors[35]. In 
simulated scenarios, relevant information can be teased out with details using predetermined and 
standardized scenarios within a relatively short period of time.  
The model of this dissertation study demonstrated that when the components of the 
system frame and practice frame collide, operational problems occur, which trigger nurses to 
adapt their behaviors to accommodate the problems and accomplish the medication 
administration (see Figure 5.1). The study results reported in Chapter IV showed nurses came up 
with various strategies when adapting. Some of the strategies would affect the functioning of the 
system frame and the practice frame. For example, nurses would communicate patiently with 
physicians when being interrupted during medication administration, or nurses would perform 
proactively when an updated order had not been verified by the pharmacy in a timely manner. 
These behaviors would affect the functioning of “organization” of the system frame and the 
“efficiency” of the practice frame. From this point of view, adaptations should be considered as a 
dynamic process of performance. Future studies could take longitudinal perspective to discover 
the evolution of the system frame and practice frame, and then explore how nurses’ adaptation 
impacts on planned changes of the two systems.   
The study site of this dissertation consistently audits nurses’ BCMA compliance report. It 
is a real time database with the BCMA compliance rate of all in-hospital units. It also shows the 
top reasons identified by nurses for overriding the system when scanning the medications and the 
patients’ barcodes. The goal of the compliance rate of order scanning and patient scanning are 
both above 95%. The top reason for non-compliant order scanning has been barcode of the 
medication was not available. The top reason for non-compliant patient scanning was that the 
  135 
barcode of the wristband was not readable. But based on the results of the observations and 
interviews with the nurses in the hospital, there is information missing, if researchers only look 
at the compliance numbers. For example, is this top reason picked up by nurses only because this 
was the first reason popped up on the screen when nurses had to override and there was no other 
reason better applied, or this is the actual reason for them to override? Although nurses didn’t 
override, did they go through operational problems during medication administration? Why was 
the non-compliant rate of this specific nurse on this specific unit always higher than others? It 
will be very innovative to conduct observations and interviews about medication administration 
and compare to the contemporary non-compliant rate of scanning to piece together the picture of 
medication administration practice. The results can shed lights on professional development and 
work education, in terms of how to override appropriately.    
In summary, this study presented a new conceptualization of adaptation to operational 
problems of BCMA, a conceptualization that moves beyond the negative connotations of 
workarounds.  Future studies are needed to validate this conceptualization, and to address 
BCMA system design issues that introduce collisions when work systems do not correspond to 
the practice goals of safe and effective medication administration.  
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